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I. INTRODUCTION 
It is certain every man has a right to keep his own sentiments, if he 
pleases; he has certainly a right to judge whether he will make them 
public, or commit them only to the sight of his friends.1 
For centuries courts have recognized property rights in personal 
correspondence.2  As far back as 1741, courts have held that authors of 
letters retain rights to their expressions even after recipients take 
possession of the letters.3  Private expression has received the protection 
of property.4  Today the new medium of personal correspondence, email, 
demands that same protection.5  At the click of a mouse, email recipients 
parade others’ expression literally around the world, often creating a 
most embarrassing outcome for the original sender.6  Electronic 
                                                     
 1. Millar v. Taylor, (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 242 (K.B.). 
 2. See, e.g., Lish v. Harper’s Magazine Found., 807 F. Supp. 1090, 1110 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) 
(discussing damages for publication of copyrighted letter); Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 349 
(C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) (Story, J.) (discussing copyright invasion of plaintiff’s letters); 
Grigsby v. Breckinridge, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 480, 484–85 (1867) (discussing property rights of letters 
and their contents); Baker v. Libbie, 97 N.E. 109, 111 (Mass. 1912) (discussing writer’s property 
rights in letters); Millar, 98 Eng. Rep. at 242 (discussing property rights of manuscript); Pope v. 
Curl, (1741) 26 Eng. Rep. 608, 608 (Ch.) (discussing property rights of writers and receivers of 
letters). 
 3. See Pope, 26 Eng. Rep. at 608 (granting injunction to stop publication of a book of letters 
written by Alexander Pope). 
 4. See, e.g., Baker, 97 N.E. at 111 (“The right of the author to publish or suppress publication 
of his correspondence is absolute in the absence of special considerations . . . .”); Woolsey v. Judd, 
11 How. Pr. 49, 55 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1855) (“We must be satisfied, that the publication of private 
letters, without the consent of the writer, is an invasion of an exclusive right of property which 
remains in the writer, even when the letters have been sent to, and are still in the possession of his 
correspondent.”); Gee v. Pritchard, (1818) 36 Eng. Rep. 670, 675–76 (Ch.) (“It has been decided, 
fortunately for the welfare of society, that the writer of letters, though written without any purpose of 
profit, or any idea of literary property possesses such a right of property in them, that they cannot be 
published without his consent, unless the purposes of justice, civil or criminal, require the 
publication.”); accord James Madison, Property, NATIONAL GAZETTE, Mar. 27, 1792, in 14 THE 
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 266 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1983) (“[A] man has a property in 
his opinions and the free communication of them.”). 
 5. See Robert A. Cinque, Making Cyberspace Safe for Copyright: The Protection of 
Electronic Works in a Protocol to the Berne Convention, 18 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1258, 1258–59 
(1995) (“With the click of a mouse or the tap of a key, virtually anyone with a computer and a 
telephone can obtain vast quantities of information from almost anywhere on the globe.  These 
conditions pose a formidable challenge to the international protection of intellectual property.  
Copyrighted works, which include . . . forms of expression, are especially vulnerable to piracy.” 
(footnotes omitted)); Posting of James Grimmelmann to Yale LawMeme, Accidental Privacy Spills: 
Musings on Privacy, Democracy, and the Internet, http://research.yale.edu/lawmeme/modules.php? 
name=News&file=article&sid=938 (Feb. 19, 2003, 22:02 EST) (observing the harmful impact of not 
protecting email expression through copyright law, i.e., inhibition of creative and frank thought). 
 6. See Grimmelmann, supra note 5 (reciting the intense scrutiny that the Pulitzer Prize 
winning, Newsday reporter Laurie Garrett experienced after her personal email, which provided a 
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forwarding is killing private expression.7  Stripped of expressive privacy, 
email senders are beginning to restrain expression: where an email 
sender would rather a sentiment not be forwarded to a third party, the 
sentiment is simply left out of the email.8  Creative, frank, and clear 
expression is suppressed to avoid the costly tariff of exposure on the 
information superhighway.9  Email demands the privacy protection that 
for centuries the law has afforded personal correspondence.10 
Past protection of expressive privacy has existed under common-law 
copyright.11  For over two-hundred years, common-law copyright offered 
near-absolute protection to authors of letters.12  This protection came 
through a specific right called the right of first publication.13  The right of 
                                                                                                                       
candid description of the World Economic Forum, ended up all over the Internet); Charles Mandel, 
E-Mail Stink Proves Web’s Power, WIRED NEWS, Mar. 10, 2003, http://www.wired.com/news/ 
privacy/0,1848,57960,00.html (reporting that a personal email that recommended its recipients 
boycott fish-farming products had, after the email had been forwarded without its sender’s consent, 
caused widespread alarm among fish farmers that resulted in a public apology from the sender); Ben 
McGrath, Oops, THE NEW YORKER, June 30, 2003, at 34–35, available at http:// 
www.newyorker.com/talk/content/?030630ta_talk_mcgrath (collecting stories about unintended 
consequences of email recipients forwarding sender’s expressions without permission). 
In addition to the restraint of expression that individuals experience, businesses may incur 
financial or reputational costs as a direct result of unauthorized email forwarding.  See Mandel, 
supra (discussing negative repercussions to employer that a personal email of its employee caused); 
White Paper of Proofpoint, Inc. & Forrester Consulting, Outbound Email and Content Security in 
Today’s Enterprise, 2–7, 11–15 (May 2006) (on file with author) (describing policies that US and 
UK employers implement to reduce costs resulting from unauthorized viewing of employees’ email). 
 7. Cf. Mandel, supra note 6 (quoting professor of journalism at Columbia University for 
proposition that email senders must restrict their expression to that which the senders would be 
comfortable viewing on the front page of a newspaper). 
 8. See id. (advising restraint in email expression); cf. Grimmelmann, supra note 5 (opining 
that unprotected email may lead to a dulling of expression). 
 9. See sources cited supra note 6; cf. Woolsey, 11 How. Pr. at 62–63 (“[L]etters never 
intended to be published, and written on familiar subjects, are usually more interesting and valuable 
than those elaborately written and originally intended for the press.”). 
 10. See Woolsey, 11 How. Pr. at 63 (opining that “private letters, although not intended to be 
published, and however familiar and trivial the subjects to which they relate” were the proper subject 
of copyright law, and that “the writer of such letters has an absolute right to forbid their publication 
by another”). 
 11. See cases cited supra note 2; 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT § 5.04 (2006) (describing the protection that copyright law affords letters). 
Under specific circumstances, email could be protected under trade-secret law.  See, e.g., APG, 
Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 436 F.3d 294, 307 (1st Cir. 2006) (contemplating whether disclosure 
of email constituted violation of corporate trade secret, but ultimately determining that no violation 
occurred because the information was not of a confidential nature).  To receive that protection, an 
email must (1) mention a trade secret, and (2) disclose the trade-secret information under an 
established confidential relationship.  ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 3.03 
(2005).  The application of trade-secret law to email, however, is outside the scope of this Article.  
The Article considers the protection that the law confers on senders of email, regardless of the email 
expression’s content. 
 12. See cases cited supra note 2. 
 13. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 551 (1985). 
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first publication allowed an author exclusive control over whether and 
when a letter would be published to a third party who was not originally 
intended as the recipient.14  The right ensured that letter recipients could 
not copy the expression in a letter and give that copy to a third party.15  
In other words, the right provided a letter author the exclusive power to 
decide whether and when the expression in a letter—even if already sent 
to its intended recipient—would be published.  Publication to a third 
party was controlled by the author.  For example, an unfaithful husband 
who sent amorous letters to his lover could control whether and when his 
lover could copy and distribute those letters to any other person.16  
Notably, common-law copyright afforded this right to authors without 
requiring that an author follow any formal procedure, registration or 
otherwise.17  The cheating husband would hold a common-law copyright 
in the letters as soon as he penned the ink.  Any expression qualified for 
common-law protection.18 
Then in 1976 that all changed when Congress passed the Copyright 
Act.19  The Act preempts any common-law rights that are equivalent to 
rights set forth under the Act.20  One of the rights in the Act purports to 
provide authors a right of first publication.21  It seems, then, that letter 
authors and email senders must now rely on the Act’s purported right of 
                                                     
 14. See id. (describing the common-law right of first publication as “the author’s right to decide 
when and whether [the work] will be made public”); Woolsey, 11 How. Pr. at 67 (“[T]he writer of 
letters has an exclusive right not only to publish them himself, but to forbid their publication by 
others . . . .”). 
 15. See Grigsby v. Breckinridge, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 480, 488 (1867) (suggesting that publication 
would occur if a recipient were to make a copy of the original letter and distribute that to a third 
party rather than simply reading the original letter to the third party or depositing the original with 
the third party for safe-keeping); Baker v. Libbie, 97 N.E. 109, 111 (Mass. 1912) (opining that 
although an author’s right of first publication exists independent of the manuscript, “this right 
involves a right to copy or secure copies”); see also Denis v. LeClerc, 1 Mart. (o.s.) 297, 308 
(Orleans 1811) (“[T]he property of the writer of a letter may be violated, by multiplying the copies 
of it . . . .”); Millar v. Taylor, (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 242 (K.B.) (“It is certain every man has a 
right to keep his own sentiments, if he pleases: he has certainly a right to judge whether he will make 
them public, or commit them only to the sight of his friends.”). 
 16. See Barrett v. Fish, 47 A. 174, 175–76 (Vt. 1899) (considering the admissibility of letters 
exchanged between allegedly adulterous couple). 
 17. See Woolsey, 11 How. Pr. at 62–63 (reviewing precedent establishing that private letters are 
copyrightable and describing the right to publish them as “inherent in [the author] . . . until it is 
chosen to be asserted”). 
 18. See id. at 63 (noting obligation of courts of equity to protect the writers of private letters 
“without any other inquiry than into the fact of his authorship”). 
 19. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17 
U.S.C. §§ 101–1332 (2000)). 
 20. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a). 
 21. See id. § 106(3) (granting the owner of copyright exclusive rights “to distribute copies or 
phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by 
rental, lease, or lending”). 
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first publication to protect their expressive privacy.  They appear to be 
subject to the rules governing federal copyright law. 
The Copyright Act is unlikely to protect privacy for email senders 
like the common law did for letter authors.22  The Act excuses a user’s 
ostensible infringing use of a work if the use in question is deemed to be 
“fair.”23  A defense of fair use is usually recognized where the use does 
not harm the economic value of the work.24  This is relevant to email 
forwarding because the forwarding does not usually harm the sender’s 
ability to market the expression, especially given that there is often no 
market for casual email correspondence.25  The absence of any effect on 
the market for email expression would trigger the fair-use defense.26  At 
first glance, it would seem that the Act’s fair-use provision strips email 
senders of the privacy protection that the common law so readily 
afforded authors of letters.27  Email forwarding appears permissible 
under the Act.28 
Despite the Act’s fair-use provision, private email expression may 
nevertheless receive legal protection.29  A strong argument exists that the 
Act does not preempt the common-law right of first publication.30  This 
argument stems from the premise that the Copyright and Patent Clause of 
the Constitution restricts the property rights that Congress may 
legislate.31  Under the Clause, if Congress legislates property rights, 
those rights must further public utility.32  Public utility is not furthered by 
                                                     
 22. See infra Part III.A–B. 
 23. 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
 24. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985) (describing 
the economic impact of the defendant’s use of a copyrighted work as “the single most important 
element of fair use”). 
 25. See infra Part III.A.2, III.B.3 (providing the Copyright Act’s list of nonexhaustive criteria 
in determining whether the fair-use exception applies and analyzing them in the email context). 
 26. See infra Part III.A.2. 
 27. See infra Part III.C (discussing the impact of the Copyright Act on the privacy of email 
communication). 
 28. See infra Part III.A.2, III.B.3 (discussing the application of the fair-use doctrine on casual 
email correspondence and the impact of the 1992 amendment to the Copyright Act, which appears to 
remove federal copyright protection from most email). 
 29. See infra Parts III.C–D, IV (arguing that the apparent conflict in the Copyright Act can be 
resolved to still provide legal protection to private email correspondence). 
 30. See infra Parts III.D, IV (providing a constitutional argument that limits the scope of the 
Copyright Act). 
 31. See infra Part III.D.1 (discussing the Copyright and Patent Clause of the Constitution, 
which gives Congress the power to legislate property rights that promote the progress of science and 
useful arts). 
 32. See infra Part III.D.1 (discussing the utilitarian nature of the Copyright and Patent Clause of 
the Constitution). 
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a right that allows an author to withhold a work from the public.33  
Accordingly, the Constitution prohibits Congress from legislating 
property rights that function to protect an author’s privacy.34  This means 
that the Copyright Act’s purported right of first publication should not be 
construed as a right that protects an author’s privacy.35  In other words, 
the Act’s right of first publication should not be construed as a right that 
protects an author’s decision whether to publish—a decision that 
concerns privacy.36  The Act does not preempt common-law copyright to 
the extent that the common law protects an author’s privacy interest.37  
Absent preemption, the common-law right of first publication is alive 
and well.38 
Construing the Copyright Act as not preempting the common-law 
right of first publication raises interesting implications in the email 
context.39  Under the common law, unauthorized distribution of only a 
few copies constitutes publication.40  The issue arises, then, as to whether 
an email recipient violates the sender’s right of first publication by either 
displaying to third parties a printed copy of the email or forwarding the 
email to third parties.41  The common law suggests that displaying the 
printed copy is permissible insofar as the email recipient does not 
transfer that copy.42  Email forwarding, on the other hand, violates the 
sender’s right of first publication.43  Email forwarding completely 
                                                     
 33. See infra Part III.D.1 (arguing that where an author attempts to keep a work private, the 
right does not serve a utilitarian end). 
 34. See infra Part III.D.1 (discussing how the Constitution may prevent Congress from creating 
rights that do not serve the utilitarian end of the Copyright and Patent Clause). 
 35. See infra Part III.D.1 (discussing how the right of first publication is only valid to the extent 
that it serves a utilitarian end). 
 36. See infra Part III.D.2 (discussing how the Copyright Act only preempts common law rights 
equivalent to those protected in the Act). 
 37. See infra Part III.D.2 (discussing the difference in the scope of protection afforded from the 
common law and the Copyright Act). 
 38. See infra Part III.D.2 (discussing the nonequivalence of the two rights protected by the 
common law and by the Copyright Act: protecting the author from being “found out” and from being 
“scooped,” respectively). 
 39. See infra Part II (discussing the common law’s protection of email correspondence). 
 40. See Grigsby v. Breckinridge, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 480, 488 (1867) (“Publication by the author 
is circulation before the public eye by printing or multiplied copies in writing.”); Baker v. Libbie, 97 
N.E. 109, 111 (Mass. 1912) (opining that although an author’s right of first publication exists 
independent of the manuscript, “this right involves a right to copy or secure copies”); see also Denis 
v. LeClerc, 1 Mart. (o.s.) 297, 308 (Orleans 1811) (“[T]he property of the writer of a letter may be 
violated, by multiplying the copies of it . . . .”). 
 41. See infra Part II.B.1–2 (discussing the impact of forwarding or physically displaying email 
communication on the sender’s right to first publication). 
 42. See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing how at common law the recipient of a letter could show it 
to others as long as he did not make copies of it). 
 43. See infra Part II.A.2.a (discussing how forwarding an email deprives the original sender of 
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duplicates the original expression and transfers a copy of that duplication 
to a third party,44 and the common law directly prohibits this practice.45  
Finally, it should be noted that a corollary to this common-law rule is 
that an author may relinquish the right of first publication by transferring 
a copy to a third party.46  This means that carbon copying a third party on 
an email may create a presumption that the sender meant to relinquish his 
common-law protection of expressive privacy.47 
The common law’s governance of property rights in letters also 
raises implications regarding the rights that email recipients hold in 
email.  Under the common law, a letter recipient holds property rights in 
the physical materials composing a letter while the letter author retains 
rights to the expression within the letter.48  This principle suggests that 
email recipients own the computer files that constitute the received 
emails.49  The email recipient may therefore exercise physical dominion 
over the file: he may preserve, destroy, or transfer the file insofar as a 
copy does not result.50  Similarly, the recipient may physically move the 
email file to any location, and further, may display the email to a third 
party without violating the sender’s property rights.51  Finally, the 
common law suggests that email recipients to whom the sender 
mistakenly sends an email, i.e., unintended recipients, hold no property 
rights in the email file as against the sender.52  This is because the law of 
gifts and the law of finders control an unintended recipient’s property 
                                                                                                                       
his privacy). 
 44. See infra Part II.A.2.a (describing how email forwarding works). 
 45. See infra Part II.A.2.a (discussing how principles at common law that prevent the copying 
of letters apply to email communication to not allow email forwarding). 
 46. See Kortlander v. Bradford, 190 N.Y.S. 311, 313 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1921) (“This exclusive 
right is confined to the first publication.  When once published it is dedicated to the public, and the 
author has not at common law any exclusive right to multiply copies of it or to control the 
subsequent issues of copies by others.” (citing Palmer v. De Witt, 47 N.Y. 532 (1872))); Widdemer 
v. Hubbard, 19 Pa. C. 263, 264–65 (C.P. 1887) (discussing how a husband destroyed his privacy 
expectation when he allowed a bishop to read the letter to his wife and therefore the wife was 
allowed to spread the publication of the letter if she wished). 
 47. See infra Part II.A.2.c (discussing how carbon copying a third party on an email causes the 
sender to relinquish the right of first publication). 
 48. Baker v. Libbie, 97 N.E. 109, 111–12 (Mass. 1912) (“The [letter] author parts with the 
physical and material elements which are conveyed by and in the envelope.  These are given to the 
receiver.”). 
 49. See infra Part II.B (discussing the rights of letter recipients at common law and the 
applicability of those rights to email recipients). 
 50. See infra Part II.B.1 (discussing how an email recipient’s property rights are in the 
computer file and not the expression contained within the email). 
 51. See infra Part II.B.1 (describing permissible transfers of email communication). 
 52. See infra Part II.B.3 (explaining the rights of unintended recipients of email communication 
using the principles of gift-and-finders law). 
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rights in the email file.53  A donee of a gift must be the intended donee to 
acquire property rights as against the donor.54  Unintended email 
recipients, then, hold no property rights to the email as against the 
sender: they are finders of lost property, and accordingly, must destroy it 
upon the sender’s request.55 
This Article examines the extent to which an email sender may 
enforce property rights to email expression to ensure privacy.  Part II 
applies the common-law right of first publication to the email context.  It 
discusses how common-law principles that govern the rights of letter 
authors and recipients affect the rights of email senders and recipients.56  
Part III examines whether the Copyright Act adopts the common-law 
right of first publication.  It concludes that the Act does not incorporate 
the same privacy protection as the common-law right of first publication 
because the Act allows for liberal application of the fair-use defense.57  
Part III next examines whether the Act preempts the common-law right 
of first publication.58  Based on the view that the Copyright and Patent 
Clause restricts Congress to legislate property rights that further a 
utilitarian purpose, Part III posits that the Act cannot constitutionally 
protect an author’s interest in keeping a work from the public.59  For this 
reason, Part III posits that the Act does not preempt the common-law 
right of first publication.60  Part IV evaluates whether a dual copyright 
system—the common-law system to protect privacy interests and the 
federal-law system to protect commercial interests—is advisable.  It 
examines issues relating to whether a dual system is practicable61 and 
whether privacy in expression is good policy.62  The Article concludes 
that the common-law right of first publication should be invoked to 
protect an email sender’s privacy interests. 
                                                     
 53. See Baker, 97 N.E. at 111–12 (“The author parts with the physical and material elements 
which are conveyed by and in the envelope.  These are given to the receiver.”); Eyre v. Higbee, 22 
How. Pr. 198, 204 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1861) (“We must . . . presume a grant of the letters from him to 
her.”). 
 54. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 31.1 (1992) (“The owner 
of personal property may make a gift thereof to another person (the donee) by delivering it to the 
donee . . . with the manifested intention that the donee be the owner of the personal property.”). 
 55. See infra Part II.B.3 (describing how unintended recipients of emails are finders of lost 
property and as such have inferior property rights to the email as the sender). 
 56. See infra Part II.A–B. 
 57. See infra Part III.A–C. 
 58. See infra Part III.D. 
 59. See infra Part III.D.1. 
 60. See infra Part III.D.2. 
 61. See infra Part IV.A. 
 62. See infra Part IV.B. 
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II. THE COMMON LAW’S PROTECTION OF EMAIL EXPRESSION 
Property rights in email expression derive from the common law’s 
recognition of property rights in personal correspondence.  At common 
law, a letter author held property rights in the expression of the letter, 
and a letter recipient held property rights only to the physical 
components of a letter.63  Application of this simple principle in the 
email context suggests that dual categories of property rights exist in any 
email.  The sender retains rights to the electronic expression; the 
recipient receives rights to the physical email file.  The following 
subparts analyze these respective rights. 
A. The Rights of Email Senders 
Common-law copyright’s protection of an author’s private 
expression traces back to the eighteenth century.64  Well established is 
the common-law principle that an author retains a right to control the 
first instance that the author’s expression may be made public.65  Under 
this right, a letter author controls whether the letter will be published to 
the public, and if so, when it will first be published.66  “Public” in this 
                                                     
 63. See Baker v. Libbie, 97 N.E. 109, 111–12 (Mass. 1912) (“The author parts with the 
physical and material elements which are conveyed by and in the envelope.  These are given to the 
receiver.”). 
 64. See Millar v. Taylor, (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 242 (K.B.) (“[T]he manuscript is, in every 
sense, his peculiar property; and no man can take it from him, or make any use of it which he has not 
authorized, without being guilty of a violation of his property.”); Pope v. Curl, (1741) 26 Eng. Rep. 
608, 608 (Ch.) (“[W]here a man writes a letter, it is in the nature of a gift to the receiver.  . . . [T]his 
does not give a license to any person whatsoever to publish them to the world, for at most the 
receiver has only a joint property with the writer.”). 
 65. See Grigsby v. Breckinridge, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 480, 488 (1867) (“[W]e incline to the 
conclusion that the weight of authority, fortified by analogy, preponderates in favor of the author’s 
special property in the publication, and in his consequential right to publish . . . .”); Woolsey v. Judd, 
11 How. Pr. 49, 70 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1855) (interpreting English common law to have rejected the 
argument that “there can be no property” in “familial letters, not intended by the writers to be 
published”); Barrett v. Fish, 47 A. 174, 175 (Vt. 1899) (dictum) (“[T]he view most consonant with 
reason, justice, and sound public policy is that which holds that a court of equity will protect the 
right of property in such letters by enjoining their unauthorized publication by any person who may 
attempt or intend such publication.  Such protection is based solely on the property of the writer or 
possessor of such letters therein.”).  Perhaps the strongest endorsement of the property nature in the 
rights that an author holds over personal correspondence is found in Baker v. Libbie: “The existence 
of a right in the author over his letters, even though private and without worth as literature, is 
established on principle and authority.  The right is property in its essential features.  It is, therefore, 
entitled to all the protection which the Constitution and laws give to property.”  97 N.E. at 111. 
 66. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 551 (1985) (describing 
the common-law right of first publication as “the author’s right to decide when and whether [the 
work] will be made public”); Baker, 97 N.E. at 111 (“The right of the author to publish or suppress 
publication of his correspondence is absolute in the absence of special considerations, and is 
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sense has a broad meaning: it means any third party who is not the 
original intended recipient.67  Sending a letter to its intended recipient, 
then, does not amount to making expression “public,” whereas sending a 
copy of the letter to any other person does.  The right effectively allows 
an author to keep expression private regardless of whether the expression 
has any literary value.68  This right is referred to as the right of first 
publication.69 
Applying this right of first publication to email requires 
understanding the principle of privacy underlying this right and the 
common-law rules growing out of this right.  This principle of privacy, 
the attendant rules of the common law, and their application to email are 
set forth below in the ensuing subparts. 
1. The Common Law’s Protection of Privacy 
Common-law copyright exists to protect privacy in written 
expression.70  That purpose was articulated by Samuel Warren and Louis 
                                                                                                                       
independent of any desire or intent at the time of writing.”). 
 67. See Grigsby, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) at 484–85, 488–89 (defining publication as circulation before 
the “public eye” and suggesting that publication would occur if a recipient were to make a copy of 
the original letter and distribute that to a third party rather than simply reading the original letter to 
the third party or depositing the original with the third party for safe-keeping); accord Baker, 97 
N.E. at 111 (opining that although an author’s right of first publication exists independent of the 
manuscript, “this right involves a right to copy or secure copies”); Denis v. LeClerc, 1 Mart. (o.s.) 
297, 308 (Orleans 1811) (“[T]he property of the writer of a letter may be violated, by multiplying the 
copies of it.”); Millar, 98 Eng. Rep. at 242 (“It is certain every man has a right to keep his own 
sentiments, if he pleases: he has certainly a right to judge whether he will make them public, or 
commit them only to the sight of his friends.”). 
 68. See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 346 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) (Story, J.) (“I 
hold, that the author of any letter or letters . . . whether they are literary compositions, or familiar 
letters, or letters of business, possess the sole and exclusive copyright therein; and that no persons, 
neither those to whom they are addressed, nor other persons, have any right or authority to publish 
the same upon their own account, or for their own benefit.”); Baker, 97 N.E. at 111 (“The existence 
of a right in the author over his letters . . . is established [even without worth as literature] . . . .”); 
Woolsey, 11 How. Pr. at 63, 68 (commenting that “[e]very writing, in which words are so arranged 
as to convey the thoughts of the writer to the mind of a reader, is a literary composition” to support 
its holding that copyright applies to “private letters, although not intended to be published, and 
however familiar and trivial the subject to which they relate” to the extent that an author holds “an 
absolute right to forbid their publication by another”); Gee v. Pritchard, (1818) 36 Eng. Rep. 670, 
675–76 (Ch.) (“It has been decided, fortunately for the welfare of society, that the writer of letters, 
though written without any purpose of profit, or any idea of literary property possesses such a right 
of property in them, that they cannot be published without his consent, unless the purposes of justice, 
civil or criminal, require the publication.”); accord Denis, 1 Mart. (o.s.) at 302 (holding that “the 
right of publishing a letter remains exclusively in the writer” notwithstanding that the letter was “not 
written with a view to profit”). 
 69. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 552; see also Birnbaum v. United States, 588 F.2d 319, 326 (2d 
Cir. 1976) (“[T]he common law copyright is, in essence, a right of first publication, which of 
necessity includes the right to suppress any publication by injunction.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 70. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 554 (“It is true that common-law copyright was often 
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Brandeis in their seminal 1890 Harvard Law Review article, The Right to 
Privacy.71  Warren and Brandeis opined that the right of first publication 
under common-law copyright is a manifestation of a more general 
right—the right to be let alone.72  Underlying the right to be let alone, 
Warren and Brandeis declared, is the ideal of an inviolate personality.73  
And, they continued, part of one’s personality is one’s expression: 
making public an expression that was intended to be private constitutes 
an attack on personality.74  Warren and Brandeis thus concluded that an 
interest inherent in one’s person, which falls within the ambit of the 
general right to be let alone, is the interest one holds in privacy of 
expression.75  Personal correspondence represents one’s very personality, 
and so, Warren and Brandeis argued, such correspondence merits as 
much protection as any other personality interest.76  It merits protection 
of its inherently private nature.77 
This interest in keeping correspondence private is apparent in the 
email context.  Senders of email are interested in ensuring that no one 
other than the intended recipient views the electronic recording of the 
sender’s expression.78  That is, the sender desires that a copy of the email 
will not end up in the hands of a third party.79  This of course does not 
                                                                                                                       
enlisted in the service of personal privacy.”); Paul Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 
70 COLUM. L. REV. 983, 1004 (1970) (“[C]ommon law copyright, in its coverage of letters, . . . 
protects personal rather than economic values and clothes privacy with the attributes of property.”); 
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 198 (1890) 
(“The common law secures to each individual the right of determining, ordinarily, to what extent his 
thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated to others.”). 
 71. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 70, at 198–99, 204–05. 
 72. Id. at 205.  The right to be let alone is, according to Warren and Brandeis, a right inherent 
in one’s person; specific examples of this general right include the right not to be assaulted or 
beaten, the right not to be imprisoned, and the right not to be defamed.  Id. 
 73. See id. (“The principle which protects personal writings and all other personal productions . 
. . is . . . that of an inviolate personality.”). 
 74. Id. 
 75. See id. (“[T]he conclusion [is] that the protection afforded to thoughts . . . is merely an 
instance of the enforcement of the more general right of the individual to be left alone.”). 
 76. Id. at 205–07. 
 77. Id. at 205. 
 78. See Grimmelmann, supra note 5 (opining that unprotected email may lead to a dulling of 
expression); Mandel, supra note 6 (relying on professor of journalism at Columbia University for 
proposition that email senders must restrict their expression to that which the senders would be 
comfortable viewing on a public website). 
 79. Two examples illustrate this interest of a sender.  The first occurred when a Newsday 
reporter and former Pulitzer Prize winner, Laurie Garrett, wrote a candid email summarizing her 
experience at the World Economic Forum in Switzerland.  Grimmelmann, supra note 5.  Without a 
doubt, the email was written very casually: she called Vicente Fox “sexy”; she described the wireless 
infrastructure as “very cool”; she misstated the phrase “various and sundry” as “various insundry.”  
Id.  Garrett then sent the email to a “handful” of friends.  Id.  About a week after sending it, the 
email had been forwarded several times, and to Garrett’s dismay, appeared on a publicly accessible 
website.  Id.  After that, it became public news.  See, e.g., Mandel, supra note 6 (reporting Garrett’s 
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apply to all email senders: there can be no doubt that some senders of 
email do not expect, and perhaps discourage, their email to be kept 
private.80  Just as some authors of letters do not mind if their sentiments 
are passed along to third parties, so also do some email senders not 
expect any privacy restriction.81  But the relevant point is that the interest 
to hold expression private is present in the email context, regardless of 
whether all email senders hold that interest. 
The question of whether the law should secure an email sender’s 
interest in privacy raises the issue of whether the type of personal 
correspondence to which Warren and Brandeis referred, and that the 
common law contemplates, is sufficiently analogous to email 
correspondence.  Simply put: Do the principles and rules governing 
expression in physical letters extend to expression in email?  The opinion 
expressed by Warren and Brandeis suggests so.  They opined that the 
right to privacy underlying letter correspondence exists “wholly 
independent of the material on which, or the means by which, the 
thought, sentiment, or emotion is expressed.”82  This conclusion appears 
to be correct.  The privacy interest that copyright protects is with respect 
to the expression—not the physical material on which the expression is 
recorded.83  Expression in electronic form is just as much a part of one’s 
personality as expression on physical paper.  Principles, rules, and 
rationales governing expression in letters should apply to expression in 
email.  The privacy interest that underlies common-law copyright has a 
place in email expression. 
                                                                                                                       
email experience). 
The second example occurred when a high-level employee of an environmental nonprofit 
foundation sent a private email to a limited number of recipients.  Id.  The employee was an 
aquaculture specialist for the foundation.  Id.  In the email she advised the recipients to fax fish 
farmers that they were boycotting fish products over an issue relating to sea lice.  Id.  The email 
included the following line: “Tormenting fish farmers is fun – it really, really is.”  Id.  Not long after 
sending it, the email found its way onto the public stage of the Internet.  Id.  The fish-farm industry 
was very displeased with her sentiments, and imputed the employee’s email to the environmental 
foundation.  Id.  Predictably, the employee issued an apology.  Id. 
 80. For instance, senders of “spam” email would not seek to maintain privacy of expression.  
See Am. Online, Inc. v. Nat’l Health Care Disc., Inc., 174 F. Supp. 2d 890, 894–97 (N.D. Iowa 
2001) (suggesting that senders of spam email commercially benefit from massive distribution of 
their expression). 
 81. See, e.g., id. at 894 (explaining a case in which the National Health Care Discounts’ vice-
president contacted an emailer to send commercial email for a fee). 
 82. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 70, at 199. 
 83. See Baker v. Libbie, 97 N.E. 109, 112 (Mass. 1912) (teaching that a letter recipient has 
rights to the physical components of a letter “as absolute owner subject only to the proprietary right 
retained by the author for himself and his representatives to the publication or nonpublication of 
ideas in its particular verbal expression”); Warren & Brandeis, supra note 70, at 206–07 (suggesting 
that privacy protection extends to various media of expression). 
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2. The Right of First Publication 
The common law secures privacy of expression through the right of 
first publication.84  That right can be thought of as comprising two steps.  
The first step represents the author’s choice to decide whether to publish 
the expression in the letter.85  An author may decide never to publish the 
expression such that the author’s privacy receives protection 
indefinitely.86  In that circumstance, the second step is never reached.  If, 
on the other hand, the author does decide to publish it, the second step 
occurs: the right of first publication allows the author to decide when the 
first publication will occur.87  This second step protects the author’s 
interest in keeping the expression private from the point of publication 
decision to the actual time of publication.88  The second step protects the 
expression’s yet-to-be-realized commercial value, which the author has 
already decided to realize.89  Realization of an expression’s commercial 
value depends on the author being able to publish the expression before 
anyone else.90  In this way, the second step—the right to decide when to 
publish—protects the author’s interest in realizing the commercial value 
of the expression.  Thus, the right of first publication protects two 
seemingly contrary interests: the author’s interest in keeping the 
expression private, and the author’s interest in realizing commercial gain.  
The right protects the former interest by allowing the author exclusive 
control over whether to publish; the right protects the latter interest 
                                                     
 84. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 553 (1985) (describing 
privacy as purpose of right of first publication). 
 85. Id. at 551; see also Grigsby v. Breckinridge, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 480, 484 (1867) (“[T]he 
author should have the right to decide for himself whether the publication would be useful to the 
public and profitable to himself . . . .”); Baker, 97 N.E. at 112 (“[An author]’s proprietary power is to 
make or restrain a publication . . . .”); Woolsey v. Judd, 11 How. Pr. 49, 67 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1855) 
(“[T]he writer of letters has an exclusive right not only to publish them himself, but to forbid their 
publication by others . . . .”). 
 86. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 551 (“Under common-law copyright, the property of the 
author . . . in his intellectual creation [was] absolute until he voluntarily part[ed] with the same.” 
(internal quotations omitted)); Denis v. LeClerc, 1 Mart. (o.s.) 297, 302 (Orleans 1811) (“[T]he right 
of publishing a letter remains exclusively in the writer, till he abandons it, and if not abandoned, 
passes at his death to his representatives.”). 
 87. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 551 (stating that “publication . . . [before the author] has 
authorized its dissemination seriously infringes on the author’s right to decide when and whether” to 
publish). 
 88. See Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1120–21 
(1990) (observing a distinction between protection of unpublished works that were created for 
publication or on their way to publication and unpublished works never intended for publication). 
 89. See id. at 1122 (summarizing the concerns relevant in protecting the expectations of 
creators that copyright law was created to protect). 
 90. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 554–55 (stating that the “author’s control of first public 
distribution implicates . . . his property interest . . . which [is] valuable in [it]self”). 
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(where the author does decide to publish it) by allowing the author 
exclusive control over when to publish.91 
The common law’s protection of expressive privacy through the right 
of first publication is nearly absolute.92  Exceptions are rare.93  The fact 
that an unauthorized copy may appear “reasonable and customary” does 
not affect the strength of the author’s common-law right.94  Further 
privacy protection is manifest by the common law’s definition of 
publication: “publication” constitutes any circulation of a multiplication 
of the original expression.95  This definition prohibits circulating even 
                                                     
 91. See id. (“In its commercial guise, . . . an author’s right to choose when he will publish is no 
less deserving of protection.”). 
 92. See Baker v. Libbie, 97 N.E. 109, 111 (Mass. 1912) (“The property right of the author . . . 
to publish or suppress publication of his correspondence is absolute in the absence of special 
considerations.”); Woolsey v. Judd, 11 How. Pr. 49, 62–63 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1855) (“[T]he writer of 
such letters has an absolute right to forbid their publication by another . . . .”). 
 93. Circumstances where a court has ruled that publication is proper even though the author 
does not consent include the following: (1) the letter is necessary for a recipient to establish rights in 
a lawsuit, Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 346–47 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) (Story, J.); (2) 
parts of a letter are necessary to furnish information that will vindicate the recipient’s character and 
reputation, or free the author from unjust humiliation and reproach, id.; (3) the author intends to 
dedicate his or her rights to the expression to the public or to the recipient, id.; (4) the letter is from a 
public officer to a government body, id.; (5) the letter constitutes an instrument or means for the 
accomplishment of an unlawful purpose, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Int’l Magazine Co., 294 F. 
661, 663 (2d Cir. 1923); and (6) the author relinquishes the right by publishing the letter, Widdemer 
v. Hubbard, 19 Pa. C. 263, 264–65 (C.P. 1887). 
 94. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 550–51. 
 95. See Grigsby v. Breckinridge, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 480, 488–89 (1867) (“Publication by the 
author is circulation before the public eye by printing or multiplied copies in writing.  . . . [A letter 
recipient] may do every thing but multiply copies, and perhaps he may do this, if he do [sic] not print 
them.” (internal quotations omitted)); Baker, 97 N.E. at 112 (“In this opinion, publication has been 
used in the sense of making public through printing or multiplication of copies.”); Widdemer, 19 Pa. 
C. at 264–65 (holding that letter author had made publication by sending the letter to two third-party 
recipients in addition to its intended recipient). 
Tellingly, the Grigsby court commented that a recipient may be able to “multiply” copies of an 
author’s expression so long as the recipient does not “print” those copies.  65 Ky. (2 Bush) at 489.  It 
is possible that at the time of the opinion in 1867, “multiplying” copies by hand did not suggest that 
the recipient was distributing the copies to third parties, whereas “printing” copies by machine did 
suggest third-party distribution. 
One court has held that a publication did not occur where there occurred a limited distribution of 
copies of a letter.  Birnbaum v. United States, 588 F.2d 319, 327 (2d Cir. 1978).  That court’s 
holding, however, seems misstated.  The reason for the copying and distribution was to maintain 
national security.  Id. at 321.  Public policy dictates that this reason for copying and distribution 
appears to be a justifiable exception to the right of first publication.  Hence, the Birnbaum court’s 
holding appears correct insofar as it permits publication on the basis of a compelling government 
interest.  It appears incorrect insofar as it labels the copying and distribution as anything other than a 
publication.  See id. (finding that “reading of the plaintiff’s letters by several persons, none of whom 
circulated them to the world, is not a publication that destroys the value of the work”). 
A less common but broader definition of publication is any multiplication of the original 
expression, irrespective of whether the multiplication is circulated.  See Denis v. LeClerc, 1 Mart. 
(o.s.) 297, 308 (Orleans 1811) (“[T]he property of the writer of a letter may be violated, by 
multiplying the copies of it . . . .”).  The rationale for this broad definition appears to be that an extra 
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one copy of a letter.  For instance, it precludes distributing a copy of 
amorous communications by a husband’s lover.96  Distribution of even 
one copy of such a letter would be sufficient to destroy the lover’s 
privacy, especially when that copy finds its way into the hands of the 
husband’s former wife.97  The common-law protection of privacy 
prohibits letter recipients from distributing any copy of the expression.98 
a. Common-Law Prohibition of Email Forwarding 
Under the recognized common-law definition of publication, an 
email sender may preclude the recipient from distributing copies of the 
email to third parties.  A frequent occurrence of such distribution arises 
in the practice of email forwarding.  Email forwarding is common 
because it is so effortless: a click of the mouse allows complete 
duplication and distribution of the sender’s expression.99  Nevertheless, 
the fact that forwarding may be performed with ease does not alter the 
fact that the forwarding deprives the sender of privacy.100  The common 
law would forbid that act, for the expression in an email is as private as 
the expression in a letter.  The ease of copying the expression should not 
affect the analysis to determine whether the act in question—forwarding 
an email—invades the sender’s privacy interest.  Common-law copyright 
principles condemn email forwarding as a violation of the sender’s 
property rights in the electronic expression.101 
                                                                                                                       
copy of a letter could possibly come into possession of a third party, so that copy could possibly 
destroy the author’s privacy in the expression. 
 96. See King v. King, 168 P. 730, 733 (Wyo. 1917) (prohibiting former wife from gaining 
possession of copy of letter from husband’s second wife, where letter was allegedly relevant to 
divorce proceeding). 
 97. Id. 
 98. See, e.g., Grigsby, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) at 488–89 (recognizing the duty of privacy and secrecy 
of personal letters); Baker, 97 N.E. at 111 (noting that the exceptions to the “absolute right of the 
author to prevent publication by the receiver” are “narrow and rare”); Denis, 1 Mart. (o.s.) at 308 
(“[T]he property of the writer of a letter may be violated, by multiplying the copies of it . . . .”); 
Widdemer, 19 Pa. C. at 264–65 (discussing the right to privacy and possible waivers); King, 168 P. 
at 731 (protecting privacy right in a letter relevant to a divorce proceeding). 
 99. See Grimmelmann, supra note 5 (describing why copying and redistributing another’s 
expression is so effortless through the email-forwarding function). 
 100. See generally, e.g., id. (describing the intense scrutiny that Pulitzer Prize Newsday reporter, 
Laurie Garrett, experienced after her personal email, which provided a candid description of the 
World Economic Forum, ended up all over the Internet). 
 101. Accord Warren & Brandeis, supra note 70, at 199 (opining that the right of first publication 
“is wholly independent of the material on which, or the means by which, the thought, sentiment, or 
emotion is expressed”); see also Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 279 N.Y.S.2d 51, 57 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967) (dictum) (recognizing author’s right of first publication with regard to a 
telegram, which, like email, constitutes expression by means of electrical impulse), aff’d, 285 
N.Y.S.2d 568 (N.Y. 1967). 
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An argument may be made that email forwarding is permissible 
because the practice is so common.102  All email programs have 
forwarding capability, so any email sender with reasonable knowledge of 
how email works will know that the email recipient has the ability to 
forward along the email to any third party.  Any sender who is at all 
familiar with email practice should know that email recipients often 
utilize this forwarding capability.  It is arguable, then, that by sending an 
email, the sender implicitly consents, or at least assumes the risk, that the 
expression in the email may be forwarded to a third party.  Common 
practice, and thereby common sense, suggests that the sender implicitly 
consents to email forwarding based on the sender’s very use of email. 
It is also arguable that email forwarding is permissible because 
recipients do so not for the purpose of duplicating the expression therein, 
but rather to communicate to a third party the senders’ ideas.  Authority 
exists for the proposition that the right of first publication does not secure 
an author property rights in the idea that the author has expressed, but 
rather only in the expression of that idea.103  A recipient arguably 
forwards email to communicate a sender’s idea within the expression 
rather than to communicate the sender’s actual expression.  Stated 
differently, a recipient would paraphrase the sender’s expression except 
that the single-click method of forwarding is easier than expending effort 
to paraphrase.  This reason for recipient forwarding suggests that the 
recipient does not intend to pirate the recipient’s expression, but rather 
intends only to communicate the recipient’s ideas.104  On this basis it is 
arguable that forwarding is permissible. 
These two arguments in favor of email forwarding are not 
persuasive.105  The first argument stems from the notion that the number 
                                                     
 102. Cf. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. See, 46 S.W.3d 65, 67 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) (dictum) (“Implied 
permission is determined from the facts and circumstances of the case and usually arises from a 
course of conduct of the parties over a period of time.”); Penza v. Century Indem. Co., 197 A. 29, 30 
(N.J. 1938) (dictum) (“Permission to take and use a car upon a particular occasion . . . may in a 
proper case be implied by usage and common practice of the parties.”). 
 103. See Baker, 97 N.E. at 112 (opining that letter author holds proprietary right to “verbal 
expression”); accord Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 356 (1991) 
(recognizing that copyright applies to expression, rather than idea within the expression, under 
federal Copyright Act). 
 104. See sources cited infra note 105. 
 105. The common practice of email forwarding merits a brief discussion on how the descriptive 
term of “forward” may be affecting social acceptance of copyright-infringing behavior.  
Unsurprisingly, programmers of email software chose the word “forward” to denote the process of 
copying an email and distributing to a third party.  The term “forwarding” does not suggest 
impermissibility.  Under the common law, a person who merely forwards along a misrepresentation 
is arguably not liable for that misrepresentation.  See, e.g., Dickerson v. Trinity-W. Title Co., 985 
S.W.2d 687, 690–91 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999) (determining that title company was not liable for seller’s 
misrepresentation on the basis that the title company “merely passed along the information [it] had 
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of people engaging in email forwarding should make the practice 
reasonable and customary.  But common-law copyright permits 
“reasonable and customary” uses only if the author impliedly consents to 
such uses by releasing a work for public consumption.106  In other words, 
under the common law there must be publication before what is 
reasonable and customary becomes relevant as to whether a use of a 
work is permissible.107  Assuming the email sender does not publish the 
email, there would be no implied consent.108 
The second argument bases liability on intent: the recipient 
apparently does not intend to pirate expression, but rather simply 
forwards the email because clicking the forward button is less 
burdensome than paraphrasing the sender’s expression.  Justice Story 
rejected such a contention in a landmark common-law copyright case, 
Folsom v. Marsh:109 “The intention to pirate is not necessary in an action 
of this sort; it is enough, that the publication complained of is in 
substance a copy, whereby a work vested in another is prejudiced.”110  
Intent is, according to Justice Story, irrelevant in determining whether 
expressive piracy has occurred.111  Regardless of whether the intent to 
pirate is present, a recipient who forwards email violates the email 
sender’s right of expression.112 
                                                                                                                       
received”).  Forwarding suggests the act of passing along so that the email recipient acts as a mere 
pass-along, or in other words a connection, between the original sender and the ultimate third-party 
recipient.  See WEBSTER’S ENCYCLOPEDIC UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
(1989) (defining “forward” as meaning “to send forward; transmit, esp. to a new location”).  This 
meaning of forwarding would be legally accurate if in fact the sender requested, or consented to, the 
third-party’s receipt of the email.  In that instance, the original email recipient would act as a mere 
pass-along because the recipient would be a chain in the distribution that the sender had intended.  
But copying and distributing an email without permission does not reflect the common-usage 
dictionary-definition of “forward.”  In that circumstance, the meaning would more likely be captured 
by the terminology, “copy and redistribute.”  Yet a “copy and redistribute” button is not as spatially 
efficient on a computer screen.  It is possible, then, that users of email forward private 
correspondence based on, at least in part, the subtle mis-identification applied to the feature that 
enables the recipient to copy the email and distribute it to others without permission.  A user is less 
likely to recognize the impermissibility of copying and distributing based on the seemingly 
innocuous label of “forward.” 
 106. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 550–51 (1985). 
 107. See id. (stating that “fair use traditionally was not recognized as a defense to charges of 
copying from an author’s as yet unpublished works” (citations omitted)). 
 108. See Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609, 
1662–63 (1999) (arguing against “consent traps” on websites). 
 109. 9 F. Cas. 342, 349 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901). 
 110. Id. at 348. 
 111. Id. 
 112. See id. (stating that the inclusion of excerpts of copyrighted material would be “an invasion 
of that right”). 
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The common law’s rejection of common practice and intent to 
uphold expressive privacy is based on the fact that ensuring expressive 
privacy ultimately ensures better quality expression.113  If email senders 
lack an expectation of privacy, creative and frank expression become 
guarded.114  Email senders speak more freely than they otherwise would 
when they have an assurance that the expression in the email will not be 
forwarded without permission.115  The possibility of forwarding email 
deters senders’ expression.116  And if the current state of email is such 
that senders do in fact expect an email to be forwarded, then 
communications are not as creative and frank as they otherwise could 
be.117  The presence of an expectation that recipients will forward email 
does not represent a legal norm, but rather a deficiency in the 
enforcement of senders’ rights of expression.  Consistent with the 
common-law right of first publication, the law should be strengthened so 
that “forwarding” is recognized as impermissible copying and 
distribution. 
b. Limits to the Right in the Email Context 
Applying the common-law right of first publication to the email 
context raises issues regarding whether an email recipient violates that 
right by the mere fact that the email server that the recipient utilizes 
makes copies of the email expression during the email delivery 
process.118  Stated another way, the technical process of receiving email 
                                                     
 113. See Woolsey v. Judd, 11 How. Pr. 49, 62–63 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1855) (“[L]etters never 
intended to be published, and written on familiar subjects, are usually more interesting and valuable 
than those elaborately written and originally intended for the press.”). 
 114. See Mandel, supra note 6 (quoting a professor of journalism at Columbia University for the 
proposition that email senders must restrict their expression to that which the senders would be 
comfortable viewing on the front page of the newspaper); see also Grimmelmann, supra note 5 
(positing that email senders will not include private sentiments if expression is not protected); cf. 
Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 
1373, 1425–26 (2000) (arguing that invasion of informational privacy will lead people to be more 
cautious). 
 115. See sources cited supra notes 113–14. 
 116. See sources cited supra notes 113–14. 
 117. See Mandel, supra note 6 (stating that email senders should not send an email unless they 
are comfortable with it being published on the front page of the newspaper); Grimmelmann, supra 
note 5 (stating that people “will stop using email for certain matters, if this is what happens when 
they use it”); cf. Cohen, supra note 114, at 1426 (“The condition of no-privacy threatens not only to 
chill the expression of eccentric individuality, but also, gradually, to dampen the force of our 
aspirations to it.”). 
 118. See Marshall Brain, How E-mail Works, http://www.howstuffworks.com/email.htm/ 
printable (last visited Jan. 13, 2007) (stating that a server may save several pieces of information 
from an email). 
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requires copies of the email to be made for the ultimate benefit of the 
email recipient,119 and those copies raise the issue of whether the 
sender’s right of first publication is violated.  As further discussed below, 
that technical process suggests that there should be limitations on an 
email sender’s right of first publication. 
The process for sending and receiving email is rather simple.  An 
email recipient must employ an email client, which is a program that 
allows recipients to read email, e.g., Outlook Express or Eudora.120  
Outlook Express (and all other email clients) receives email through an 
email server.  Email servers are machines that transmit email files 
between each other through the Internet.121  So, each email recipient 
employs an email client, e.g., Outlook Express, which receives data from 
a specific email server, and that email server receives data from other 
email servers which respectively correspond with the email clients of the 
email senders.122  This process is relevant to the right of first publication 
because when a recipient’s email server “sends” an email file to the 
recipient’s email client, the server actually makes a copy of the file and 
sends the copy to the client.123  Outlook Express receives only copies of 
email files from an email server; the original email files lie with the 
email server.124  After sending a copy to Outlook Express, the server 
either retains the original email file or deletes it.125 
This process raises the issue of whether copies of email that Outlook 
Express receives from its email server violate the sender’s right of first 
publication.  The issue is magnified where a recipient may designate 
through the email client that the recipient be able to view the email both 
through the email client, e.g., Outlook Express, and through the email 
server on the Internet, e.g., the Yahoo! server.126  If the email server 
sends a copy to the email client and also retains the email file, an email 
recipient may view the email through both the email server and the email 
client.  The user may access two copies of the expression—one on the 
user’s hard drive through Outlook Express and another on the email 
                                                     
 119. Id. 
 120. Id.  Like Outlook and Eudora, some email clients stand alone, meaning that they exist 
independently of the Internet on the user’s computer machine; by contrast, some email clients exist 
on the Internet, such as Yahoo! and Hotmail. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. See id. (discussing how email clients save coded versions of email attachments that are then 
decoded for the user automatically). 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id.  The recipient would actually view the copy on the email server through an email client 
program that interfaces through the server through the Internet.  Id. 
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server of Yahoo!.  The copy that an email server sends to Outlook 
Express seems to violate the sender’s right of first publication.127  It is a 
copy that the sender never expressly authorizes. 
This seeming violation should not be viewed as an actual violation of 
the sender’s right of first publication.  By engaging in email, a sender 
implicitly consents to the electronic processes involved in delivering 
email to the intended recipient.  Part of that delivery process consists of 
an email server copying the email file and sending the copy to Outlook 
Express, or any other email client.  The copying is a necessary step in 
email delivery, for a recipient must employ an email client to view email.  
Furthermore, the fact that a recipient might view the email through two 
different sources—Outlook Express on the recipient’s hard drive and the 
Yahoo! email server on the Internet—does not lessen the sender’s 
privacy.  That the recipient may access two copies of the same 
expression does not imply that an unintended third party will view the 
sender’s expression.  There is no circulation of a copy to a third party.  
The existence of two copies does not imply that the sender has lost any 
privacy.  In the absence of privacy deprivation, there should be no 
violation of the right of first publication.128 
Given that an email server may make and distribute a copy of the 
email to Outlook Express without violating the sender’s right of first 
publication, an issue arises as to whether the email server may 
permissibly make and distribute multiple copies of the email to multiple 
email clients.  Simply put, an issue arises as to whether multiple persons 
may receive the same email that a sender transmits to one email address.  
This issue exists because several persons may each have their own 
Outlook Express program that receives email through the same email 
address as the other persons.  That is, multiple email clients may be tied 
to a single email address on an email server, so that multiple persons may 
receive the same email sent to a single email address.  For example, 
multiple editors of a law review might each have Outlook Express on 
their own computers, and through those Outlook Express programs, the 
editors might each receive a copy of any email sent to 
editors@lawreview.edu.  An issue thus arises as to whether the multiple 
copies that the email server sends each email client would constitute a 
violation of the sender’s right of first publication. 
It appears that in certain circumstances the right of first publication is 
                                                     
 127. See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the right of first publication). 
 128. The issue of whether an email recipient may provide a third party access to the email stored 
through the recipient’s email client or email server raises an entirely different issue.  This Article 
addresses that issue in Part II.B.2.a. 
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violated where one email address corresponds to multiple email clients.  
Those circumstances arise where the email address signifies that only 
one person will receive the email: in that situation, the sender reasonably 
expects that only one recipient will receive the expression.  Tying 
multiple email clients to a single-name email address would contravene 
that expectation.  For example, if a student sent an email to a particular 
professor’s email address, such as nsnow@uark.edu, the student would 
expect that only the professor would receive that email.  The expectation 
would of course be violated if it turned out that other professors also 
received the student’s email through that address.  Because the email 
address suggests that only one recipient will receive the email, the 
presence of multiple recipients would effectively result in the expression 
being published to unintended third parties.  Therefore, where an email 
address indicates that only one person will receive the email, the 
presence of multiple recipients on that email address (through multiple 
email clients) likely would violate the sender’s right of first publication. 
In the situation where an email address fails to indicate that only one 
person will receive the email file, it appears that the right of first 
publication would not be violated.  The email sender would have no 
expectation that the email would be received by only one person.  By 
sending an email to editors@lawreview.edu, an email sender would not 
reasonably expect that only one editor will receive the email.  It is as 
though the email sender sent each editor an individual email.  That being 
the case, it is noteworthy that the email sender still has an expectation of 
privacy in the email sent to each recipient.  The email sender has an 
expectation that each recipient receiving email through the single email 
address will not disclose the expression to third parties.129 
In summary, copies of email sent from an email server to an email 
client, such as Outlook Express, do not violate the right of first 
publication where there is only one email client corresponding to the 
email address.  If there are multiple email clients corresponding to an 
email address, and if the email address suggests that only one recipient 
will receive the email through that address, then the copies that the email 
server sends to the multiple clients violate the sender’s right of first 
publication.  By contrast, if an email address does not suggest that only 
one recipient will receive the email through that address, then the right of 
first publication is not violated, and the sender retains a right of first 
                                                     
 129. An ostensible presence of multiple email clients on a single email address is analogous to 
an email sender designating multiple recipients in the “to” field of the email.  The sender would have 
an expectation of expressive privacy as to each recipient, and accordingly, would hold a right of first 
publication as to each identical expression received by each recipient.  See infra Part II.A.2.c. 
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publication over each copy distributed to each recipient of the email 
address. 
c. Relinquishment of the Right by Carbon Copying 
Under common-law copyright, once an author publishes a letter to a 
third party who is not the intended recipient, the author has relinquished 
the right of first publication.130  For instance, if an author were to send a 
letter to its intended recipient, and then send a copy of that same letter to 
a third party, the author would have published the letter to the third party, 
and accordingly would have relinquished his or her right not to publish 
the letter.131  The author’s publication to a third party thereby excuses a 
recipient’s subsequent publication.132  By publishing a letter to a third 
party, the author foregoes the common law’s protection of privacy.133  
The rationale underlying this rule of relinquishment is simple: If the 
author were interested in keeping a letter private, the author would not 
provide a copy of the letter to the third party. 
The principle that an author relinquishes the right of first publication 
upon publishing the private expression to a third party raises 
complexities in the email context.  An email sender often sends a single 
email to multiple recipients using a variety of different methods.  It is 
arguable that each of these methods result in relinquishment of the 
sender’s common-law right of first publication.  The simplest method 
occurs when an email sender specifies more than one email address in 
the “to” field.  Each “to” field recipient receives an identical expression 
from the sender.  Arguably, then, the sender has relinquished the right of 
first publication by publishing the expression to more than one person. 
With regard to multiple “to” field recipients, this relinquishment 
argument would not likely succeed.  Designating multiple “to” field 
recipients is analogous to sending an identical letter to multiple 
recipients.  If a letter author intends for the expression in the letter to 
                                                     
 130. See Kortlander v. Bradford, 190 N.Y.S. 311, 313 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1921) (stating that “once 
published it is dedicated to the public, and the author has not at common law any exclusive right . . . 
to control the subsequent issue of copies by others”); Widdemer v. Hubbard, 19 Pa. C. 263, 264–65 
(C.P. 1887) (holding that the “making known to others the contents of [a] letter” constitutes a 
publication). 
 131. See Widdemer, 19 Pa. C. at 264–65 (holding that letter was published where the author sent 
the letter to two third-party recipients in addition to its intended recipient). 
 132. Id.  Although the recipient would still be subject to statutory copyright prohibition against 
copying the letter, for reasons discussed below, that general prohibition would not likely apply in the 
context of a casual email correspondence.  See infra Part III.A–C. 
 133. Widdemer, 19 Pa. C. at 264–65. 
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address each individual recipient, the author retains a right of first 
publication as to each letter recipient, regardless of whether the other 
recipients receive the identical expression.  For example, consider an 
author who sends an identical letter, which perhaps complains generally 
about working conditions at large corporations, to three different 
corporate executives, each addressed to “Dear Corporate Executive.”  
The author retains an interest in maintaining privacy of expression that 
the author has made to each executive, even where the author specifies in 
the letter that the author is sending an identical letter to all three 
executives.  The executives receive a letter that is intended to address 
them—not merely reiterate an expression made to a different person.  
Thus, the fact that the author sends identical expressions to multiple 
recipients should not detract from the privacy interest that the author 
holds as to the same individual expression sent to each recipient.  In the 
email context, the same reasoning applies.  Even though a sender may 
transmit an identical expression to each “to” field recipient, for purposes 
of the email sender’s interest in maintaining privacy, the email sender 
has effectively written individual identical emails to each recipient.  The 
author retains a right of first publication with respect to the multiple 
emails received by the respective multiple email recipients.  Multiple 
“to” field recipients merit multiple instances of privacy protection. 
Although the presence of multiple “to” field recipients does not 
suggest that the sender relinquishes the right of first publication, a 
contrary conclusion arises where a sender designates a recipient in the 
“carbon copy” field.  Carbon copying (or blind carbon copying) 
constitutes copying the expression sent to the intended recipient listed in 
the “to” field and sending that copy to a third party to observe.  An email 
sender who carbon copies someone is analogous to an author of a letter 
who copies the letter, stamps the letter with the word “copy,” and then 
sends the original to a recipient and the stamped copy to a different 
recipient for review.  The express label of “copy” stamped on a letter 
sent to a party other than the letter’s intended recipient would evidence a 
finding that the author intended to copy and distribute the expression 
meant for the intended recipient, or in other words, that the author 
published it.  The author would not have intended for the expression in 
the copy to be addressed to, or apply to, the third-party recipient. 
In the email context, the carbon-copy feature electronically stamps 
the carbon-copy recipient’s email with a mark indicating that the sender 
intended to make a copy of the original email and distribute it to a party 
other than the intended recipient.  It evidences an intent to create a copy 
for the purpose of third-party review or observation.  That is, the 
electronic carbon-copy stamp suggests that the sender does not intend for 
SNOW FINAL.DOC 7/15/2007  3:48:30 PM 
2007] A COPYRIGHT CONUNDRUM 525 
the email expression to apply to the carbon-copy recipient, but rather 
intends for the carbon-copy recipient to receive a record of the 
expression sent to the “to” field recipient.  Common-law copyright rules 
therefore suggest that an email sender relinquishes the right of first 
publication when the sender includes a carbon-copy or blind-carbon-
copy recipient in the email. 
The distinction that common-law copyright draws between multiple 
“to” field recipients and a “carbon copy” recipient warrants criticism.  
An email sender may intend for the email expression to apply to a 
carbon-copy recipient as much as the sender intends for the email to 
apply to multiple “to” field recipients.  Perhaps the sender desires to 
separate two recipients by placing them in the separate “to” and “carbon 
copy” fields because the visual appearance of two names separated 
vertically is easier to identify than is the appearance of two names 
separated by a semicolon in a horizontal string.  Perhaps a sender desires 
to send the same email to multiple recipients without revealing any 
recipient’s identity to any other recipient.  In that circumstance, the 
sender might designate himself as the “to” field recipient, and then 
designate all other intended recipients in the blind-carbon-copy field.  
The email text would not indicate that the message was directed to a 
specific recipient.  Hence, in view of the purposes for which senders 
employ the carbon-copy (and blind-carbon-copy) field, the mere use of 
that field should not necessarily suggest relinquishment of the right of 
first publication.  Use of the carbon-copy field does not necessarily 
suggest that the sender intends for the email expression to apply only to 
the recipients listed in the “to” field and not to those listed in the carbon-
copy field. 
This criticism has merit.  Where the content of the email indicates 
that the sender intends for the content of the email to apply to the carbon-
copy field recipient as much as the “to” field recipient, the fact that the 
sender employs the carbon-copy field should not imply that the sender 
has relinquished the right of first publication.  Ultimately the issue of 
whether publication to a third party has occurred—or in other words the 
issue of relinquishment—raises a question of fact contingent upon a 
sender’s intent.  Nevertheless, where the content does not expressly 
indicate that the expression applies to the carbon-copy recipient, the fact 
that the sender has employed the carbon-copy feature should create at 
least a presumption of relinquishment.  Standing alone, carbon copy 
indicates an intent to publish: it functions as a discrete indicator of an 
intent to copy and distribute the email to a third party for the purpose of 
making the expression which was sent to the “to” field recipient known 
to that third party.  Use of this feature presumptively establishes an intent 
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by the sender to relinquish the right of first publication.134  Only if 
circumstances demonstrate otherwise should the carbon-copy feature not 
be viewed as evidence of relinquishment by the sender. 
B. Rights of Email Recipients 
The common law endows letter recipients with property rights,135 
which implies that email recipients also hold property rights.  Once 
delivery occurs, the letter recipient receives by gift property rights to 
possess the physical components of the letter: the physical paper, the 
envelope, the ink, and the postage stamp.136  So while copyright secures 
an author property rights in the letter’s expression, property law secures 
the recipient property rights to the physical components of the letter.137 
Other than publishing the letter, a recipient may exercise all rights 
over a physical letter inherent in personal property.138  The recipient may 
preserve the letter against the wishes of its author.139  Further, the 
recipient may dispose of the letter by destroying, selling, or otherwise 
                                                     
 134. By contrast, a recipient’s use of the “forward” feature does not suggest that the sender has 
relinquished the right of first publication.  Assuming that the sender does not forward the email, the 
forwarding label evidences the recipient’s intent to copy and distribute the email expression.  
Relinquishment of the right of first publication hinges upon the intent of the sender—not the intent 
of the recipient.  Accordingly, if a recipient forwards an email, the sender retains his right of first 
publication. 
 135. See Baker v. Libbie, 97 N.E. 109, 111–12 (Mass. 1912) (“The author parts with the 
physical and material elements which are conveyed by and in the envelope.  These are given to the 
receiver.”); Woolsey v. Judd, 11 How. Pr. 49, 64 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1855) (recognizing the English 
common-law principle that “the receiver of letters has only a special or qualified property, confined 
to the material on which they are written, and not extended to the letters as expressive of the mind of 
the writer”). 
 136. See Grigsby v. Breckinridge, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 480, 486 (1867) (“[T]he unqualified delivery 
of the letter [is] adjudged a gift of all the author’s right to it, except his right to publish if existing, 
and to prevent the publication of it without his consent.”); Baker, 97 N.E. at 111–12 (declaring that 
the material elements “conveyed by and in the envelope . . . are given to the receiver” such that “the 
right in the receiver of an ordinary letter is one of unqualified title in the material on which it is 
written”); Eyre v. Higbee, 22 How. Pr. 198, 204 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1861) (“We must . . . presume a 
grant of the letters from him to her.”); see also Woolsey, 11 How. Pr. at 63 (relating, without 
objecting to, the assumption of a litigant’s argument that “sending of letter is in the nature of a gift to 
the receiver”). 
 137. See Baker, 97 N.E. at 112 (teaching that a letter recipient has rights to the physical 
components of a letter “as absolute owner subject only to the proprietary right retained by the author 
for himself and his representatives to the publication or nonpublication of ideas in its particular 
verbal expression”). 
 138. See Grigsby, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) at 488 (“[T]he recipient may rightfully make any use of the 
letter which will not, in the same sense, amount to publication . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 139. See id. at 484 (“By sending [the letters], the authors parted with their right to the 
possession, control, or reclamation of them without [the recipient’s] consent, and gave her the 
exclusive right to read and keep them for their enduring memories and sentiments.”). 
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transferring it.140  It is noteworthy that transferring the letter does 
impinge on the author’s interest in maintaining privacy: through transfer, 
an unintended third party gains permanent access to the author’s 
expression.  The reason that transfer is permissible despite its 
encroachment on the author’s privacy interest appears to be that the 
recipient’s property rights over the physical letter are absolute.141  When 
the author gives the letter to the recipient, the author parts with rights to 
the letter’s physical components, and the recipient becomes the rightful 
owner.142  As rightful owner of the letter, the recipient is not subject to 
restraints on alienation.143  In short, a person’s right of alienation in 
personal property appears to be a stronger legal interest than is the 
interest of protecting another person’s right to maintain expressive 
privacy.144  Alienability appears to be a stronger interest than privacy.145  
At the cost of invading a degree of the author’s privacy, then, the 
recipient may transfer the letter. 
These common-law principles governing property rights to a 
physical letter imply that an intended email recipient holds property 
rights in the electronic computer file that constitutes the email.  The 
sender transmits the computer file to the recipient, and that file gives rise 
to the evanescent display on the computer screen.146  As owner of the 
computer file, the recipient may preserve the file on a storage device, or 
alternatively, dispose of the file.147  Disposal by destruction is apparent:  
 
                                                     
 140. See id. at 486 (“[T]his general property implies the right in the recipient to keep the letter or 
to destroy it, or to dispose of it in any other way than by publication . . . .”); Baker, 97 N.E. at 112 
(“[An author]’s proprietary power is to make or to restrain a publication, but not to prevent a 
transfer.”). 
 141. Grigsby, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) at 486; Baker, 97 N.E. at 112. 
 142. See supra notes 135–36 and accompanying text (describing a recipient’s rights to the letter). 
 143. See Dyer v. Dyer, 566 S.E.2d 665, 668 (Ga. 2002) (“‘It is the policy of the law to encourage 
free alienability of property, and attempts to remove either land or chattels from circulation in trade 
are discouraged . . . by the rule against unreasonable restraints on alienation.’” (quoting Leathers v. 
McClain, 338 S.E.2d 666, 667 (Ga. 1986))). 
 144. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 489 cmt. a (1944) (“The policy of the law has been, in 
general, in favor of a high degree of alienability of property interests.  This policy arises from a 
belief that the social interest is promoted by the greater utilization of the subject matter of property 
resulting from the freedom of alienation of interests in it.”); cf. Jessica Litman, Information 
Privacy/Information Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1296–1301 (2000) (arguing that a property-
based theory to further privacy must fail because property necessarily requires rights of alienability, 
which fosters exchange, and exchange contravenes privacy). 
 145. See supra note 144 and accompanying text (discussing alienability and privacy in terms of 
property interests). 
 146. See Brain, supra note 118 (describing the email process). 
 147. See Grigsby v. Breckinridge, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 480, 486 (1867) (discussing right of recipient 
of a letter “to keep the letter or to destroy it, or to dispose of it”); Baker v. Libbie, 97 N.E. 109, 112 
(Mass. 1912) (discussing letter recipient’s right to deal with the letter as “absolute owner”). 
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the recipient simply deletes the file.  Disposal by sale or other transfer 
merits further discussion.148 
1. The Right to Transfer Email 
Permissible email transfer by a recipient requires a physical transfer 
of the email computer file.  Because the recipient holds property rights in 
the computer file, rather than the expression within the email, the 
recipient may not simply forward the email to effect a transfer.149  By 
forwarding an email, the original email recipient makes a reproduction of 
the expression in the email, and the right to reproduce the expression is 
not within the bundle of rights that the recipient holds in the physical 
components of the letter.150  A recipient may therefore exercise the right 
to transfer the email file only if the transfer results in physical movement 
of the file to the transferee.151  A permissible transfer must be a physical 
transfer. 
Physical transfer of email raises several complexities.  Email files 
exist within physical storage devices.152  Specifically, an email could 
exist on a recipient’s hard drive where the email client, e.g., Outlook 
Express, has saved the file sent from the email server, or alternatively, an 
email could exist on the email server accessible through the Internet.153  
Physical transfer in the former situation—the email file existing on the 
recipient’s hard drive—requires that the recipient physically transfer the 
hard drive on which Outlook Express originally saved the email file.  If 
the email file exists only on the hard drive, the recipient physically 
controls the email only to the extent that the recipient is able to control 
the hard drive on which the file exists.  A physical transfer would 
therefore require a transfer of the hard drive. 
The second situation—the email file existing on the email server—
raises a complexity under the physical transfer requirement.  The email 
file on the email server would belong to the recipient, but the storage 
                                                     
 148. See infra Part II.B.1 (discussing rights of email recipients to transfer emails). 
 149. See supra Part II.A.2.a (discussing email forwarding). 
 150. See supra Part II.A.2.a (discussing email forwarding).  The fact that an email recipient 
might forward the original email expression as an attachment rather than as inline text does not 
affect the argument that the email recipient does not hold a right to reproduce that original 
expression.  Regardless of its digital form, the original expression belongs to the original email 
sender. 
 151. See Grigsby, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) at 488 (discussing letter recipient’s right to deposit letters at a 
place of recipient’s choosing); Woolsey v. Judd, 11 How. Pr. 49, 57–58 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1855) 
(discussing letter recipient’s rights to control only the material on which expression is written). 
 152. See Brain, supra note 118 (explaining how email works on the Internet). 
 153. See id. (explaining the mechanics of how email clients and servers work). 
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device on which that file is saved would belong to the owner of the email 
server, an internet service provider.  In that situation, the recipient’s 
circumstance would be analogous to that of a building owner whose 
building lies on land of a separate landowner.154  Just as the building 
owner uses and leases the land on which the building lies from a 
landowner, an email recipient stores email files on and rents server space 
from an internet service provider.155  And just as the building owner 
cannot transfer title to the land underlying the building, the email 
recipient cannot transfer title to the server on which the recipient’s email 
is saved.156  Instead, the building owner and email recipient may transfer 
rights of dominion and control over their respective properties.157  To be 
effective, the transfers must be subject to the property rights of the 
respective landowner and an internet service provider.158 
Like a transfer of email stored on a hard drive, a transfer of email 
stored on a server belonging to an internet service provider must be 
absolute.159  The email recipient who accesses email through an email 
server on the Internet, e.g., Yahoo!, must transfer his or her lease to the 
server space corresponding to the email that the recipient seeks to 
transfer.  In the analogous situation of the building owner, the building 
owner must transfer rights to lease the underlying land if the building 
owner is to effect a complete transfer of all rights to the building.160  The 
circumstances of the email context, however, preclude the email 
recipient from transferring only the leased server space that corresponds 
to a single email.161  Internet service providers do not fragment email 
accounts.162  If an email recipient desires to transfer server space 
                                                     
 154. See, e.g., Adams v. Shirk, 104 F. 54, 59–60 (7th Cir. 1900) (recognizing the conceptual 
distinction between property held by owner of a building and property held by owner of land on 
which the building sits). 
 155. See id. at 60 (discussing lease situation). 
 156. See id. (discussing lessee’s inability to transfer land underlying leased building). 
 157. See id. (discussing right to transfer). 
 158. See id. (stating that transfer of lease is subject to property rights of respective landowner). 
 159. See Grimsley v. Grimsley, 632 S.W.2d 174, 179 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982) (rejecting attempted 
transfer of property in the absence of relinquishment of total dominion and control by transferor). 
 160. See Adams, 104 F. at 60 (stating it was not in lessee’s power “to compel the desired 
forfeiture or his own discharge through the enforced acceptance of a substitute”). 
 161. The mechanics of email preclude email-account fracturing.  The email-website operator, 
which acts as the internet server through which the email is received, creates one single computer 
file on which multiple email messages may exist.  See Brain, supra note 118 (“As other people sent 
mail to [the recipient], the server would simply append those messages to the bottom of the file in 
the order that they arrived.  The [email] text file would accumulate a series of five or 10 messages . . 
. .”). 
 162. E.g., 2006 Yahoo! Terms of Service, http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms (last visited Aug. 1, 
2006) (on file with author) [hereinafter Yahoo! Terms of Service]. 
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corresponding to a particular email, the recipient must transfer all the 
server space constituting the email account.163  A recipient must sign 
over the rights to the email-website account containing the email.  For 
example, a Yahoo! subscriber could transfer an email sent to the 
subscriber’s Yahoo! email address only if the subscriber transferred all 
rights to the entire Yahoo! account.164  The transferee could then bar the 
original recipient from accessing the account, so the transfer would be 
absolute. 
It should be noted that technology provides a means for realizing the 
same outcome of transferring email which is much less cumbersome than 
the two means of transfer discussed above.  Forwarding and deleting an 
email is easier than detaching and delivering a hard drive or signing over 
an email account.  An argument exists that email forwarding and deletion 
should replace these more difficult means of email transfer.  The 
argument is one of efficiency.  The transaction cost is high where the 
recipient must physically transfer the email file; indeed, the costs of 
delivering a hard drive or signing over an email account can altogether 
prevent the transfer.  By contrast, the same result of the email being 
transferred to a third party and the original recipient not holding a copy 
of the email can be realized by a much simpler and less costly means: 
forwarding and deleting the email.  If a recipient simply forwards and 
deletes the email, the effect is the same as though the recipient were to 
provide the third party the actual physical copy of the email file on the 
recipient’s hard drive or the contract rights to the recipient’s email 
account.  Forwarding and deleting has the same effect as physical 
transfer.  The original email recipient is left with no physical record of 
the email expression, so from a pragmatic perspective, the third party’s 
copy appears to be a transfer.  An argument thus exists that the 
technological means of email forwarding and deletion should replace the 
archaic requirement of physically delivering to the third party the 
original email that the recipient received from the sender. 
                                                     
 163. See supra note 161. 
 164. An issue arises as to whether an email recipient may permissibly transfer rights of use to an 
email-website account.  Some email-website operators contractually prohibit such transfer.  See, e.g., 
Yahoo! Terms of Service, supra note 162 (noting that the Yahoo! Account is nontransferable).  
Whether those terms are enforceable is an issue outside the scope of this Article.  It nevertheless 
should be noted that such a contractual prohibition would represent a restraint on alienation with 
respect to the email recipient’s property rights to the email file contained on the Yahoo! server.  The 
common law disfavors such restraints on alienation.  See Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 
U.S. 36, 53 n.21 (1977) (“[T]o impose vertical restrictions in sale transactions would ‘violate the 
ancient rule against restraints on alienation.’” (quoting United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 
U.S. 365, 380 (1966), overruled on other grounds by Cont’l T.V., 433 U.S. at 58)). 
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This argument for transfer by email forwarding and deletion would 
not likely succeed.  The recipient may permissibly transfer the email 
without invading the sender’s privacy only because the recipient holds 
absolute property rights to the physical components of the email.165  Any 
copies of the email expression, even if the original email is deleted, fall 
within the scope of the sender’s rights to control the expression.  
Accordingly, although forwarding and deleting email may effect the 
same result as transferring rights to the physical email file that the 
recipient originally received, forwarding is not within the scope of 
property rights that an email recipient holds in the physical file.  Transfer 
can occur only by exercising rights to the physical components of the 
email, for that is the only subject matter over which the recipient holds 
property rights.  This means that the transfer must occur in either one of 
two ways: (1) a physical transfer of the storage device on which the 
recipient’s computer originally saved the file;166 or (2) a transfer of the 
contractual right to the email account containing the physical email file.  
The fact that technology provides means for realizing the same outcome 
is of no consequence.  Transferring the expression by reproducing it 
would constitute an unwarranted infringement of the sender’s right to 
control the expression. 
2. The Right to Display Email 
Another common-law rule governing letters is that a letter recipient 
may show the letter to others.167  Authority exists for the proposition that 
the recipient may display the letter to as many persons as the recipient 
desires, insofar as the recipient does not make copies of the letter.168  
This right to display arises out of the recipient’s property rights in the 
physical components of the letter, which allow the recipient to control 
                                                     
 165. See Grigsby v. Breckinridge, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 480, 486 (1867) (opining that a letter 
recipient holds property rights over the physical components of the letter); Baker v. Libbie, 97 N.E.  
109, 112 (Mass. 1912) (same). 
 166. Transfer of the storage device on which the file exists does not permit the email recipient to 
save the file onto a different storage device for the purpose of effecting a permissible transfer.  That 
is, an email recipient may not copy the email file from the storage device on which the email was 
originally saved (e.g., the recipient’s hard drive) onto a different storage device (e.g., a floppy disk) 
for the purpose of effecting a physical transfer of the email file. 
 167. See Baker, 97 N.E. at 112 (dictum) (noting that with regard to a recipient’s rights over 
letters, “there must be inferred a right of reading or showing to a more or less limited circle of 
friends and relatives”). 
 168. See Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 97 (2d Cir. 1987) (“[Plaintiff]’s letters 
are unpublished, and they have not lost that attribute by their placement in libraries . . . .”). 
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the physical possession, and thereby location, of the letter.169  If a 
recipient were not allowed to show the letter to others, the recipient’s 
right to control the physical location of the letter would be severely 
restricted.  To uphold the recipient’s property rights to the physical 
components of the letter, common-law copyright recognizes that a 
recipient may place the letter in a physical location for other persons to 
view.170 
This common-law principle implies that an email recipient may 
display the email to others.  The issue arises, then, as to whether there are 
limitations on the method for displaying the email.  Most akin to 
displaying a physical letter would be displaying an email to a third party 
while the email is visible on a computer screen.  A screen display does 
not affect the email file on the recipient’s hard drive or internet email 
account.  That method of display instead requires any third party to be 
present at the computer on which the recipient may access the email.171  
This method appears most similar to the circumstances surrounding a 
letter recipient showing the letter to a third party because it requires that 
the letter be physically located in proximity to the third party.  Screen 
display of a recipient’s email appears permissible under the common 
law. 
Other methods of display are possible.  A recipient might post the 
email on a website, might provide a third party access to the recipient’s 
email account, might print the email and show the third party that copy, 
or might print the email and give the third party that copy.  The issue of 
whether these methods are permissible under the common law is 
discussed in the following two subparts. 
 
a. Email Display on a Website 
 
Consistent with common-law recognition that a letter recipient may 
place the letter at any physical location for others to view, it has been 
held that a recipient may publicly display the letter by placing it in a 
                                                     
 169. See id. at 94–95 (“Having ownership of the physical document, the recipient . . . is entitled 
to deposit it with a library . . . .”); Grigsby, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) at 488 (discussing recipient’s right to 
deposit letters at a place of recipient’s choosing). 
 170. See Grigsby, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) at 488 (“[T]he recipient may read the letters to a friend or 
deposit them for safe-keeping without violating the author’s right of publication.”). 
 171. It is possible for an email recipient whose email is stored on an email server to view the 
email through the Internet while using a third party’s computer in order to show the email to the 
third party.  That situation would be analogous to providing a third party access to the email account 
on which the email is stored, which is addressed in Part II.B.2.a. 
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library.172  In view of this holding, the question arises as to whether an 
email recipient may publicly display the email by either posting it to a 
website or by making available the password to access a website email 
account that contains the email.  At first glance, the library and the two 
website situations seem analogous.  All persons interested in viewing an 
email may view the email on a website much like they could view it at a 
library.  Displaying the email through a website seems to be like making 
it available at a public forum, much like a library. 
This argument for website display should not succeed.  The library 
analogy fails due to a substantive distinction arising between the fora of 
cyberspace and physical space.  With respect to either a publicly 
available website or a website email account like Yahoo!, the computers 
of all persons who view the email on the website must produce a copy of 
that email display in their computers’ memory.173  Courts have held that 
computer memory is a medium on which infringing copies may be 
made.174  Accordingly, a copy of an email that is made by a computer 
that is not under the control of the intended recipient—whether that copy 
be made by accessing the recipient’s email account or by accessing a 
website—results in an unauthorized publication of the email.  By 
providing others access to an email account, or by simply posting the 
email on a publicly available website, the recipient facilitates for others a 
means to reproduce copies of the expression.175  Displaying email on a 
website or providing others access to an email account appears to violate 
the right of first publication.176 
                                                     
 172. See Salinger, 811 F.2d at 97 (“[Plaintiff]’s letters are unpublished, and they have not lost 
that attribute by their placement in libraries . . . .”). 
 173. See Fred H. Cate, The Technological Transformation of Copyright Law, 81 IOWA L. REV. 
1395, 1397 (1996) (“[D]igital expression cannot be accessed without being copied into computer 
memory . . . .”); see also Marshall Brain, How Web Pages Work, http:// 
computer.howstuffworks.com/web-page5.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2007) (explaining process for 
posting graphics files on a website). 
 174. See Stenograph L.L.C. v. Bossard Assocs., Inc., 144 F.3d 96, 101–02 (D.C. Cir. 1998) 
(finding that the defendant had illegally reproduced elements of the copyrighted work “insofar [as 
the] elements were reproduced into RAM”); MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 
519 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that a computer’s RAM constituted a fixed form of a work); Advanced 
Computer Servs. of Mich., Inc. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356, 363 (E.D. Va. 1994) (holding 
that RAM is “sufficiently ‘fixed’ to constitute a ‘copy’ under the Act”).  These cases have arisen 
under the Copyright Act, but seem just as applicable under a common-law standard.  There is no 
reason or authority supporting the argument that common-law copyright and federal copyright have 
different rules regarding the material on which a copy may be made to constitute a “copy.” 
 175. Making a letter available to the public in a library would be analogous to the website 
circumstances described above if in the library context the letter recipient made available the letter 
for library patrons for the sole purpose of patrons themselves making a copy of the letter at the 
library. 
 176. With respect to posting an email on a publicly available website, the argument that the 
website functions as a public forum for display fails for another reason.  The procedure for posting 
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Admittedly this response to the argument for website display relies 
on a very technical computer process.  It seems to employ a technicality 
to escape the inevitable consequence of allowing public display in the 
digital age. 
b. Email Display on Physical Paper 
The question of whether an email recipient may display an email that 
the recipient prints on paper raises a preliminary issue of whether the 
recipient may even print the email.  The common law suggests that 
printing is permissible.177  As stated above, the common law definition of 
publication is the circulation of any number of copies.178  The act of 
printing email does not necessarily result in circulation; it does not 
necessarily result in privacy invasion.179  If a recipient holds both the 
original electronic version of the expression and additional paper copies, 
but never exposes the copies to any third party, the email sender’s 
privacy remains unaffected.180  Because email printing itself does not 
result in a deprivation of privacy, it appears permissible for a recipient to 
make a physical copy of the sender’s electronic expression. 
The question next arises as to whether the recipient may show the 
printed email to a third party.  Privacy interests of the sender favor the 
view that the only means for an email recipient to permissibly show the 
                                                                                                                       
an email on such a website requires that a copy of the email be made for display on the website.  See  
sources cited supra note 173.  That is, the email recipient does not display the actual original email 
that he or she received from the email sender when the recipient posts it to a website.  The recipient 
must make and distribute a copy of the sender’s expression in order to post the email on a website. 
 177. In Grigsby v. Breckinridge, the court stated: “[A letter recipient] may do every thing but 
multiply copies, and perhaps he may do this, if he do [sic] not print them.”  65 Ky. (2 Bush) 480, 489 
(1867) (internal quotations omitted).  This statement would not make sense unless there were a 
distinction between multiplying copies and printing copies.  It is therefore likely that “multiplying” 
copies denotes copying by hand but not distributing those copies to third parties, whereas “printing” 
copies denotes copying by machine for the purpose of third-party distribution. 
 178. See id. at 488 (“Publication by the author is circulation before the public eye by printing or 
multiplied copies in writing.” (emphasis added)); accord Ipswich Mills v. Dillon, 157 N.E. 604, 
605–06 (Mass. 1927) (holding that copies of letter made by author, which author did not distribute, 
did not impair the property rights of the author); see also Widdemer v. Hubbard, 19 Pa. C. 263, 264–
65 (C.P. 1887) (holding that letter author had made publication by sending the letter to two third-
party recipients in addition to its intended recipient). 
 179. Grigsby, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) at 488. 
 180. See id. (stating that the recipient may make any use of the letter which does not amount to 
publication).  It is entirely plausible that a recipient would print a paper copy of the email without 
distributing it to a third party: recipients often prefer to read text on paper rather than on a computer 
screen, and evidence exists that reading words on paper is more efficient than on screens.  See 
generally Andrew Dillon, Reading from Paper Versus Screens: A Critical Review of the Empirical 
Literature, 35 ERGONOMICS 1297 (1992) (discussing numerous issues relating to reading computer 
screens versus reading on paper). 
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email is to show it on a computer screen.  By restricting the means for 
viewing the expression, a recipient might decrease the number of people 
to whom the recipient would likely show the expression.  On the other 
hand, property interests of the paper owner suggest that the owner may 
exercise full control over the paper on which the copy is printed.  The 
property rights attaching to the paper would appear to be the same before 
printing the email as after printing the email; so if the email recipient 
prints the email on paper belonging to either the recipient or a third party, 
it seems that the recipient or that third party then may exercise full 
control over that printed email.  The paper owner arguably may show it 
to anyone. 
A clear resolution of these competing interests of privacy and 
property is not readily apparent.181  The argument that the recipient 
should not be able to show the printed copy is simply that the recipient’s 
right to print email should not be extended in a manner that decreases the 
sender’s privacy.  The basis for the recipient’s right to print the email is 
that the act of printing does not result in a deprivation of privacy.  This 
basis would be ineffective if the recipient could display the printed copy 
to others.  It is possible, then, that the email recipient receives a right to 
print the email subject to a restriction that the printed copy may not be 
displayed to a third party.  Duplication of the expression would be 
permitted only to the extent that it does not decrease the sender’s 
privacy.  By printing the email, the recipient arguably exchanges the 
right to display and the right to transfer the paper on which the email is 
printed for the right to make a physical copy of the email expression. 
A counterargument exists to this argument against displaying and 
transferring printed copies.  It is that the recipient never bargains with the 
sender to print the email, so the recipient holds absolute property rights 
over the printed copy.182  This counterargument posits that the recipient’s 
right to print the email stems from the fact that printing email is a 
common practice.  Because the practice is so universally accepted, it is 
arguable that the sender implicitly consents to the practice by the very 
fact that the sender transmits email.  The consent would mean that the 
sender cannot control the physical paper on which the expression is 
printed.  It would mean that the paper copy of the email may be 
                                                     
 181. The common law has not addressed an analogous situation in the letter context, likely 
because in the context of letters during the nineteenth century it would have been easier to display 
the expression by simply showing the actual letter rather than by copying the letter and then showing 
that copy. 
 182. See Grigsby, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) at 488 (“[T]he recipient may rightfully make any use of the 
letter which will not, in the same sense, amount to publication . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
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displayed, and for that matter transferred, without regard to the sender’s 
privacy interest.  The copy of the email on physical paper arguably 
belongs as much to the email recipient as the email computer file belongs 
to the recipient. 
This counterargument is persuasive.  Although an email sender’s 
interest in privacy suggests that it would be advisable to limit the uses of 
the printed copy, it is unlikely that the sender could impose such a 
restriction.  The common practice of email appears to compel an email 
sender to allow the recipient to print the email.  In a sense, the email 
sender qualifies his or her right of expression by the mere fact that the 
sender uses email: to the extent the recipient does not publish the 
expression, the recipient may print the email on paper over which the 
recipient may exercise dominion and control.  That dominion and control 
includes showing and transferring the paper. 
A pragmatic problem with this reasoning is that if an email recipient 
may transfer the printed copy of the email, then the recipient may publish 
the expression therein.  Likewise, if the recipient prints the email on 
paper belonging to someone else, publication results.  The recipient’s 
seeming right to print a hard copy of the email, in conjunction with the 
absolute property rights that the paper owner holds over the paper on 
which the recipient prints the email, leads to the outcome that the 
recipient is able to publish the expression.  The recipient can simply 
transfer title of the printed copy to a third party, retain the electronic file, 
and thereby undermine the sender’s right of first publication.183  
Alternatively, the recipient can simply print the email on paper belonging 
to a third party. 
This pragmatic problem is resolvable.  The common-law principle 
that a letter recipient “has only a special or qualified property” right 
suggests that the recipient’s physical property rights in the email exist 
only to the extent that those rights preserve an email sender’s rights to 
control duplication and distribution of the sender’s expression.184  
Consistent with this principle, the property rights in the physical printed 
copy of the email should be tied to those in the email computer file.185  If 
both a paper form and an electronic form of the expression exist, they 
                                                     
 183. A similar argument could be made in situations where the email recipient retains a copy of 
the email on the recipient’s hard drive and on an email server.  See supra Part II.A.2.b. (discussing 
limits on common-law right of first publication in the email context).  The recipient could simply 
transfer title to the hard drive and retain the copy on the email server. 
 184. See Woolsey v. Judd, 11 How. Pr. 49, 64 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1855). 
 185. This resolution would apply to the analogous argument raised, supra, in note 183: an email 
recipient could transfer title to the hard drive only if the recipient transferred title to the email 
account on the email server along with it. 
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must exist together.  This would mean that a recipient may print an email 
on paper belonging to another, but only if the paper owner transfers title 
to the email recipient upon printing.  Similarly, the printed copy may be 
transferred to a third party, but only if the physical email file is 
transferred along with it.  Bundling together the property rights to the 
physical email file and the printed copy preserves a recipient’s right to 
control the physical nature of the email and the printed copy, yet it also 
subjects those rights to the sender’s rights of expression.  Bundling 
would maintain the sender’s privacy.  Accordingly, transfer of the email 
computer file should require the transfer of the paper copy, and likewise, 
a transfer of the paper copy should require the transfer of the email 
computer file.  Because the recipient does not retain property rights to an 
electronic or paper form of the expression when the recipient transfers 
both forms, no two persons could hold property rights to a physical 
manifestation of the expression.  There would be no publication.  Thus, 
the physical property rights of a printed email copy should be tied to 
those of the physical property rights of the email computer file. 
3. Rights of Unintended Email Recipients 
Up to this point the discussion regarding the rights of email 
recipients has relied on the assumption that the recipients of email were 
in fact the intended recipients of the email.  But that is not always true.  
Email senders often mistakenly input an incorrect email address in the 
“to” field such that the email address entered does not identify the person 
whom the sender intends to receive the email.  Occasionally, such a 
mistaken email address corresponds to an email address of an actual 
person.186  Email is sent to unintended recipients.  The question arises, 
then, whether unintended recipients of email hold property rights in the 
email. 
This question is easily answered under simple principles of gift law 
and finders law.  As stated above, a letter recipient receives property 
rights to the letter by gift from the letter author.187  To gift personal 
property to a person, a donor must deliver the property to the intended 
donee.188  Delivery occurs where the gift donor has done “all that 
                                                     
 186. See, e.g., Posting of Jeff Carlson to Jeff Carlson (. Thought), http://jeffcarlson.typepad.com/ 
thought/2005/06/misdirected_ema.html (June 13, 2005, 10:36) (“I frequently receive misdirected 
email intended for New England Coffee Company because they’re necoffeeco.com, while I’m 
necoffee.com.”). 
 187. See supra note 136 (noting that delivery of a letter is a gift of all of the author’s rights, 
excluding publication). 
 188. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 31.1 (1992) (stating that 
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normally could be done” under the circumstances to put the intended 
donee in control of the personal property.189  This means that for a sender 
to transfer property rights in the email to the intended recipient, the 
sender must do all that normally could be done to put the intended 
recipient in possession of the email.190  All that normally could be done 
includes typing the correct email address of the intended recipient in the 
“to” field.  Delivery never occurs, then, where the sender inputs an 
incorrect email address.  The actual recipient must therefore be the 
intended recipient for the actual recipient to hold property rights in the 
email under gift law. 
Although an unintended recipient holds no property rights in the 
email under gift law, an issue arises as to whether the unintended 
recipient may assert property rights over the email by virtue of the fact 
that the unintended recipient is in possession of the email.  In 
establishing property rights, “[p]ossession is very strong; rather more 
than nine points of the law.”191  An unintended recipient could therefore 
argue that mere possession of the email bestows property rights.  
Although it was not a gift, in the recipient’s inbox the email exists, and 
that—according to an unintended recipient—should be sufficient. 
This argument would not likely prevail.  The email sent to an 
unintended recipient is essentially an item that the sender mistakenly 
causes to exist in a different location than intended.  Stated another way, 
the email is a lost item.  The unintended recipient is therefore a finder of 
lost property.192  And although it is lost, the physical email file has not 
been abandoned.193  Finders of lost, but not abandoned, property hold 
property as against all others but the true owner.194  Therefore, the sender 
retains property rights to the email computer file even after the sender 
mistakenly addresses and sends the email to the unintended recipient.195 
                                                                                                                       
for a gift to be valid, the donor must deliver the personal property “to the donee with the manifested 
intention that the donee be the owner of the personal property”). 
 189. Id. § 31.1 cmt. b. 
 190. See id. (discussing what constitutes delivery). 
 191. Corp. of Kingston-up-Hull v. Horner, (1774) 98 Eng. Rep. 807, 815 (K.B.). 
 192. See id. (contemplating the possibility that a finding may occur with respect to property that 
is intended to be gifted). 
 193. See Haslem v. Lockwood, 37 Conn. 500, 506–07 (1871) (holding that plaintiff did not 
abandon property rights to manure that plaintiff left in the street, which defendant attempted to take 
possession of). 
 194. Armory v. Delamirie, (1722) 93 Eng. Rep. 664, 664 (K.B.). 
 195. It should be noted that the recipient acts as a finder of lost property, and as a finder, the 
recipient does hold property rights against all persons who are neither the intended recipient nor the 
original sender.  See id. (“[T]he finder of a jewel, though he does not by such finding acquire an 
absolute property or ownership, yet he has such a property as will enable him to keep it against all 
but the rightful owner . . . .”). 
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The fact that the sender retains title to the physical email file sent to 
an unintended recipient suggests that if the email sender requests the 
unintended recipient to destroy the email, the unintended recipient is 
obligated to comply with that demand.  Contrary to popular belief that 
email disclaimers are of no legal effect,196 an email disclaimer that 
requests an unintended recipient to destroy an email does appear to merit 
legal recognition: gift law and finders law imply that the email sender 
retains a property interest in the email.197  The following simple email 
notice appears to have legal effect: “If you are not the intended recipient 
of this email, the email sender requests that you destroy this email.”198  
Because the unintended recipient never receives a property right superior 
to the email sender, the unintended recipient must comply by deleting the 
email.199 
III. FEDERAL COPYRIGHT’S FAILURE TO PROTECT EMAIL EXPRESSION 
In 1976, Congress passed the Copyright Act.200  The Act purports to 
provide a right of first publication to authors,201 and further states that it 
preempts all other law that provides “equivalent” rights.202  At first 
glance, the Act’s codification of a right of first publication appears to 
mirror the common-law principle of protecting privacy interests in 
                                                     
 196. See Grimmelmann, supra note 5 (“People who send email from disclaimer-laden corporate 
accounts are roundly mocked; unless the email is obviously and intrinsically not meant for certain 
eyes, disclaimers are next to useless.”). 
 197. Armory, 93 Eng. Rep. at 664; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE 
TRANSFERS § 31.1 (1992) (“The owner of personal property may make a gift thereof to another 
person (the donee) by delivering it to the donee, or to a third person for the donee, with the 
manifested intention that the donee be the owner of the personal property.”). 
 198. Martin H. Myers, Cyber-Ethics 2002: Professional Responsibility and Evolving 
Technology, 701 PRACTISING L. INST. 977, 994 (2002) (providing similar email disclaimer). 
 199. The fact that rules of personal property law, such as gift law, govern property rights to 
physical email files suggests that it is possible for an unintended email recipient to gain property 
rights to the email.  Personal property may be acquired through adverse possession.  See Lightfoot v. 
Davis, 91 N.E. 582, 583 (N.Y. 1910) (“[I]t seems to be the generally accepted doctrine that by 
adverse possession title to chattels may be acquired which will be paramount to that of the true 
owner.”); cf. Sporn v. MCA Records, Inc., 451 N.Y.S.2d 750, 751 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) 
(contemplating possibility that intangible property may be acquired through adverse possession).  
Title by adverse possession arises where possession is open and notorious.  Lightfoot, 91 N.E. at 
584–85.  Accordingly, if an unintended email recipient notifies the sender of the recipient’s receipt 
of the email, and if the sender fails to request that the unintended recipient return or destroy the 
email, then after the time period applicable for adverse possession, the unintended recipient would 
arguably gain title to the physical email file. 
 200. The Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17 
U.S.C. §§ 101–1332 (2000)). 
 201. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3). 
 202. Id. § 301(a). 
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unpublished works.203  On further examination, however, the Act appears 
markedly different from the common-law doctrines that protect privacy.  
Unlike the common law, the Act provides a fair-use defense that may 
apply regardless of whether the author has decided to publish the 
work.204  A weighty criterion of the fair-use defense is whether the use 
harmfully affects the potential market for the work.205  Because casual 
email expression usually has no market potential, such expression would 
likely fall outside the scope of federal copyright protection.206 
This Part analyzes whether the Copyright Act applies to private 
email expression.  Part III.A analyzes the relevant provisions of the Act 
in the email context and concludes that the Act would likely not protect 
email expression.  Part III.B examines the caselaw and legislative history 
that deal with application of the Act to unpublished works and 
determines that these sources support the conclusion that the Act fails to 
protect email.  Part III.C discusses the theoretical tension that arises by 
interpreting the Act, including its fair-use defense as it applies to works 
that are never intended to be published, such as email.  Part III.D argues 
that the Copyright and Patent Clause of the Constitution restricts the Act 
to govern only rights that further a utilitarian purpose; that the common-
law right of first publication furthers only an author’s privacy interest; 
that this common-law right which protects private email expression falls 
outside the preemptive scope of the Act; and that the centuries-old 
common-law doctrines that have protected private letters today protect 
private emails. 
A. A Statutory Analysis of Exclusive Rights and Fair Use 
The Copyright Act provides an author exclusive rights that are 
subject to a defense of fair use.207  This subpart analyzes the rights 
                                                     
 203. Id. § 106(3) (Historical and Statutory Notes). 
 204. Id. § 107. 
 205. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985) (describing the 
effect-on-the-market criterion as “the single most important element of fair use”). 
 206. Because the Act concerns only rights that an author holds in an expression, the Act does not 
change the dual nature of the property rights to a letter, and therefore email.  See discussion supra 
Part II.B.  Regardless of whether the Act applies to email, an intended recipient does hold property 
rights in the physical email file, and an unintended recipient does not.  See discussion supra Part 
II.B. 
 207. Emails appear to fall within the defined subject matter of the Copyright Act.  The Act 
applies to “original works of authorship,” and an “original work of authorship” includes “literary 
works.”  17 U.S.C. § 102(a).  “Literary works” is defined to mean works that are “expressed in 
words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of the nature of the 
material objects, such as books, periodicals, manuscripts, phonorecords, film, tapes, disks, or cards, 
in which they are embodied.”  Id. § 101. 
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relevant to the email context and then discusses whether the fair-use 
doctrine protects otherwise infringing uses.  It concludes that fair use 
protects a recipient’s use of casual email correspondence. 
1. Exclusive Rights Under the Copyright Act 
The exclusive rights relevant to the email context include: (1) the 
right to reproduce a work; (2) the right to distribute copies of a work “to 
the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or 
lending”; and (3) the right to display a work publicly.208  The first 
enumerated right constitutes a straightforward prohibition against 
reproduction.209  Reproducing a work even without distributing that 
reproduction to a third party violates this right.210  Therefore, printing an 
email, without transferring it, violates this right.  Indeed, both printing 
and forwarding email constitute illegal reproductions of the email 
expression.211 
The second enumerated right—the right to distribute copies of a 
work to the public—is referred to in the Statutory Notes of the Act as the 
“Public Distribution” right.212  Those Notes state that the Public 
Distribution right “establishes the exclusive right of publication.”213  The 
Notes state: 
Under this provision [concerning the federal right of publication] the 
copyright owner would have the right to control the first public 
distribution of an authorized copy . . . of his work, whether by sale, gift, 
loan, or some rental or lease arrangement.  Likewise, any unauthorized 
                                                                                                                       
One requirement to receive copyright protection under the Act is that works must be “fixed in 
any tangible medium of expression . . . from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”  Id. § 102(a).  A computer file 
constitutes a sufficiently tangible medium of expression to fulfill the requirement for protection.  See 
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1453 (7th Cir. 1996) (concluding computer files are fixed 
in a tangible medium of expression). 
 208. 17 U.S.C. § 106.  The other exclusive rights comprise: the right “to prepare derivative 
works based upon the copyrighted work”; the right “to perform the copyrighted work publicly”; and 
in the case of sound recordings, the right “to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a 
digital audio transmission.”  Id. 
 209. See id. § 106(1) (providing the owner of a copyright with exclusive rights to the 
reproduction of the copyrighted work). 
 210. See Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 166 F.3d 772, 787 n.54 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing 2 
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.02[C], at 8-32 (1998)) 
(noting that copying a protected work results in a violation of the exclusive right of reproduction 
“even if it is used solely for the private purposes of the reproducer”). 
 211. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (stating the owner of the copyright has the exclusive right to 
reproduction of the work). 
 212. Id. § 106 (Historical and Statutory Notes). 
 213. Id. 
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public distribution of copies . . . that were unlawfully made would be 
an infringement.214 
This right thus appears to be the federal analogue to the common-law 
right of first publication.215  It allows an author to control the first 
publication, prohibiting unauthorized public distribution of copies.216  
Consistent with the common-law right of first publication, the Act 
further provides that the federal right of first publication ceases once the 
author has parted with ownership of the copy.217 
Despite the seeming similarity between this federal right of first 
publication and the common-law right of first publication, the two rights 
are substantively distinct.  Distributing a single copy of a work does not 
appear to constitute a publication under the federal right of first 
publication, whereas it would under the common-law right of first 
publication.218  Distribution of a single copy, or even a few copies, would 
not likely be sufficient to constitute a protected “public distribution” 
under the federal right of first publication.219  Statutory support for this 
interpretation of “public distribution” arises in the Act’s definition of 
“public display.”  With respect to “public display,” the Act provides: “To 
perform or display a work ‘publicly’ means to perform or display it at a 
place open to the public or at any place where a substantial number of 
persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social 
                                                     
 214. Id. 
 215. Compare id. (using the language “first public distribution”), with Baker v. Libbie, 91 N.E. 
109, 112 (Mass. 1912) (holding that a letter author has a proprietary right to publication and 
commenting that publication means “making public through printing or multiplication of copies”). 
 216. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (Historical and Statutory Notes). 
 217. See id. § 109(a) (“Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3), the owner of a 
particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by such 
owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the 
possession of that copy or phonorecord.”); id. § 106 (Historical and Statutory Notes) (“[T]he 
copyright owner’s rights under section 106(3) . . . cease with respect to a particular copy or 
phonorecord once he has parted with ownership of it.”). 
It is notable that the Act provides that publication does not occur when a person makes a public 
display of the work.  See id. § 106(5) (giving the owner the right to publicly display the work in 
addition to the publication rights in § 106(3)).  This is consistent with the common-law copyright 
rule that a letter recipient does not violate the right of first publication by showing the letter to 
friends or even by displaying it at a public place such as a library. 
 218. Compare 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106(3) (defining “publication” and the process of displaying a 
work “publicly”), with Grigsby v. Breckinridge, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 480, 488 (1867) (“Publication by 
the author is circulation before the public eye by printing or multiplied copies in writing.”), King v. 
King, 168 P. 730, 731, 733 (Wyo. 1917) (stating an author of a work is entitled to withhold the work 
from the knowledge of the public), and supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the rights of first publication). 
 219. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (stating the owner has exclusive rights “to distribute copies . . . to 
the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending”). 
SNOW FINAL.DOC 7/15/2007  3:48:30 PM 
2007] A COPYRIGHT CONUNDRUM 543 
acquaintances is gathered . . . .”220  This definition suggests that the word 
“public” denotes “a substantial number of persons outside of a normal 
circle of a family and its social acquaintances.”221  Accordingly, an email 
recipient who forwards the email to a few acquaintances does not appear 
to make a public distribution.222  Likewise, an email sender who carbon 
copies a few acquaintances on an email does not appear to make a public 
distribution.223  Thus, whereas the common-law right of first publication 
protects an email sender’s expression from distribution to even one third 
party, the federal right of first publication appears to apply only with 
respect to a distribution made en masse.224 
The third enumerated right—the right to display a work publicly—
extends protection beyond that provided by the common law.225  This 
right provides an author the exclusive right to make a public display of 
the work,226 where public display is defined to include a display “at a 
place open to the public or at any place where a substantial number of 
persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social 
acquaintances is gathered.”227  Whereas common-law copyright allows 
email or letter recipients to display the email or letter in a public forum 
such as a library,228 federal copyright law precludes such a display.229 
2. Fair Use Under the Copyright Act 
Perhaps the greatest difference between common-law copyright and 
the Copyright Act is the fair-use doctrine.230  Although fair use originates 
in the common law, the common law did not apply that defense where a 
work was unpublished.231  The privacy protection that the common law 
secured an author under the right of first publication was not subject to 
                                                     
 220. Id. § 101. 
 221. See id. (containing both in § 101). 
 222. See id. (requiring a “substantial number”). 
 223. See id. (appearing to require more of a distribution by the use of the word “substantial”). 
 224. See sources cited supra note 218 (defining publication in both the federal right of first 
publication and the common-law right of first publication). 
 225. 17 U.S.C. § 106(5). 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. § 101. 
 228. See supra Part II.B.2.a (noting that at least one federal circuit has held that recipients may 
“publicly” display a letter). 
 229. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106(5) (granting the owner the exclusive right to public display). 
 230. See id. § 107 (making certain types of use noninfringing). 
 231. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 549–52 (1985) (“[F]air use 
in the Copyright Act reflects the intent of Congress to codify the common-law doctrine.  . . . [F]air 
use [under the common law] traditionally was not recognized as a defense to charges of copying 
from an author’s as yet unpublished works.”). 
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fair use.232  Rather, common-law copyright established a nearly absolute 
bar against publication.233  By contrast, the fair-use provision of the 
Copyright Act allows courts to determine that otherwise infringing uses 
of an author’s unpublished work are permissible.234  The Act provides a 
list of nonexhaustive criteria to assist courts in determining whether a use 
is permissibly fair: 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is 
of a commercial nature . . . ; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) 
the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the 
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.235 
These criteria suggest that the fair-use defense would apply to casual 
email correspondence.  With respect to the first factor, an email recipient 
often does not have a commercial purpose for forwarding casual email 
correspondence to a third party.236  Often the purpose is noncommercial 
in that the recipient forwards the information to inform the third party 
about the sender’s idea or expression, without profiting from distributing 
the material.237  The recipient may also forward the email with a 
comment or criticism about the original sender’s expression.  The statute 
expressly cites comment and criticism as examples of purposes that 
would be presumptively fair.238  Furthermore, the character of the use 
appears innocuous because email forwarding has become 
commonplace.239  The common practice of email forwarding suggests 
                                                     
 232. Id. 
 233. See supra Part II.A.2 (noting that common-law copyright protects the author’s interests of 
whether and when to publish the work). 
 234. 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
 235. Id. 
 236. See id. § 107(1).  The Supreme Court has explained that the test for whether the use is of a 
commercial nature turns on “whether the user stands to profit from exploitation of the copyrighted 
material without paying the customary price.”  Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562. 
 237. An all too common email-forwarding phenomenon occurs where summer associates at legal 
and business firms express honest and harmful sentiments about their temporary employer.  See 
McGrath, supra note 6, at 34.  Recipients forward the sentiments to several persons, ostensibly not 
for a commercial purpose, and the email eventually becomes public knowledge.  See id.  For 
instance, one Harvard Law student inadvertently sent an email to law-firm employees which 
conveyed an attitude of indolence towards the work.  Id.  The email quickly became common 
knowledge, eventually appearing in The New Yorker magazine.  Id.  Other expressions forwarded 
without a commercial purpose, which eventually became public knowledge, include a summer 
associate’s email about cocaine use occurring at a law firm and a new business associate’s email 
about his sexual exploits on a business trip.  Id. 
 238. 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
 239. See Grimmelmann, supra note 5 (describing the reasons that email forwarding has become 
a common occurrence). 
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that an email sender should expect that this outcome may result.240  The 
first criterion favors fair use. 
The second and third fair-use criteria disfavor the fair-use defense.241  
Regardless of the content or economic value of the work, the second 
criterion—the nature of the copyrighted work—always weighs against 
permitting the use where the work is unpublished.242  With regard to the 
third fair-use criterion—the amount and substantiality of the portion 
used—the typical email that is forwarded includes the entire email that 
the sender expressed to the original recipient. 
The fourth criterion—the effect of the use upon the potential market 
for or value of the copyrighted work243—is, according to the Supreme 
Court, the most important of the four listed fair-use criteria.244  Applying 
this criterion to the email context reveals that it favors the fair-use 
defense.  Although the email may be personally valuable to the sender, 
this fourth criterion examines economic value as determined in the public 
marketplace for expression.245  Where email expresses casual 
correspondence, there is usually no market for the expression.246  Market 
                                                     
 240. See Mandel, supra note 6 (advising that email senders should expect this outcome). 
 241. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(2)–(3) (considering the nature of the copyrighted work and the amount 
copied). 
 242. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564 (1985) (discussing 
second fair-use criterion and commenting that “the scope of fair use is narrower with respect to 
unpublished works”); Norse v. Henry Holt & Co., 847 F. Supp. 142, 147 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (holding 
that fair use applied but noting that “[o]nly the second factor, the unpublished nature of plaintiff’s 
letters, favors plaintiff”). 
 243. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4). 
 244. See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 238 (1990) (“The fourth factor is the ‘most important, 
and indeed, central fair use factor.’” (quoting 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER 
ON COPYRIGHT § 9.02 (1989))); Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566 (describing the fourth criterion as 
“the single most important element of fair use”); accord Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City 
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 450 (1984) (analyzing fourth criterion and observing that the very 
“purpose of copyright is to create incentives for creative effort”). 
 245. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 598 (contrasting the informational value of a work’s use 
under the second criterion with the economic harm of the use under the fourth criterion). 
 246. See Hoyt v. Mackenzie, 3 Barb. Ch. 320, 324 (N.Y. Ch. 1848) (“It is evident . . . the 
complainant never could have considered [the letters] as of any value whatever as literary 
productions.  For a letter cannot be considered of value to the author, for the purpose of publication, 
which he never would consent to have published . . . .”); accord Wetmore v. Scovell, 3 Edw. Ch. 
515, 528 (N.Y. Ch. 1842) (“[T]he court of chancery has [not] exercised the power of preventing a 
publication of private letters of business on the ground of copy-right or literary property, when they 
possess none of the attributes of literary compositions . . . .”).  But see Grigsby v. Breckinridge, 65 
Ky. (2 Bush) 480, 506–07 (1867) (Williams, J., dissenting) (recognizing that Hoyt and Wetmore are 
no longer controlling authority); Woolsey v. Judd, 11 How. Pr. 49, 73 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1855) 
(rejecting court decisions holding that private letters should not receive proprietary protection). 
The view that there is no market for casual email correspondence does not hold true where the 
email sender is a public figure.  See Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 99 (2d Cir. 1987) 
(valuing author’s private letters at $500,000). 
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value of personal correspondence is usually nonextant.247  The lack of a 
potential market for personal email suggests an absence of economic 
harm, thereby implying that a recipient’s forwarding use would be a fair 
use.248 
Thus, where email is a casual correspondence with no economic 
value, a strong argument favors the defense of fair use.  The following 
facts support its application: (1) the purpose of email forwarding is not 
commercial in nature; (2) the character of email forwarding appears 
innocuous given its common practice; and (3) there is no harmful 
economic impact resulting from email forwarding.  Two of the four fair-
use criteria, one of which is the most weighty of the four, suggest its 
application.  Fair use likely excuses a recipient’s forwarding of an email 
containing casual correspondence.249  It thus appears that the Copyright 
Act falls short of protecting an email sender’s interest in keeping email 
expression private, which the common law did so well for letter authors. 
B. Caselaw and Legislative History of the Copyright Act 
The above statutory analysis suggests that the Copyright Act’s fair-
use provision likely strips an email recipient of any privacy protection.250  
Caselaw and legislative history dealing with unpublished works suggest 
that this conclusion is correct.251  Initially, however, courts considering 
the Act’s fair-use defense were reluctant to weaken the privacy 
protection that the common law had in the past afforded authors of 
unpublished works.252  As this judicial reluctance became evident, 
Congress amended the Copyright Act so that it explicitly subjected 
                                                     
 247. See generally sources cited supra note 246 (noting distinctions between private letters and 
literary compositions). 
 248. See Norse v. Henry Holt & Co., 847 F. Supp. 142, 147 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (determining that 
fourth fair-use criterion justified defendant’s use of plaintiff’s private letters on basis that “plaintiff 
ha[d] provided no evidence of a valuable market”). 
 249. In the situation where an email contains expression that is economically valuable, fair use 
would not likely apply.  For example, an unpublished manuscript of a soon-to-be best-selling novel 
that is printed in, or attached to, an email would merit as much copyright protection under the Act as 
if the unpublished manuscript had not been in an email form.  See, e.g., Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 
561, 566–69 (refusing to apply fair use to soon-to-be-published manuscript).  The first and fourth 
factors, which had favored fair-use application in casual correspondence, would in this situation 
disfavor fair use.  Id.  The economic value of such an email would be sufficient to preclude a fair-use 
defense. 
 250. See supra Part III.A.2. 
 251. See infra Part III.B.3 (discussing judicial response to the 1992 amendment of the Copyright 
Act that explicitly applied fair use to unpublished materials). 
 252. See infra Part III.B.1–2. 
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unpublished works to the fair-use defense.253  Courts responded to that 
amendment by giving less weight to the fact that a work was unpublished 
when analyzing whether a use was fair.254  Accordingly, courts now 
apply the Act so that an author’s interest in keeping a work private does 
not provide a compelling reason to keep another party from publishing 
the work.255  In general, publication must cause economic harm to the 
author before the Act protects the expression.256  The Act trades 
common-law privacy for public utility.  The subparts below describe this 
caselaw and legislative history. 
1. Supreme Court Commentary in Harper & Row 
Following the enactment of the Copyright Act, the Supreme Court 
considered whether the fair-use defense applied where a defendant, 
without authorization, published memoirs that the plaintiffs were 
preparing for publication.257  In Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. 
Nation Enterprises, the defendant, a magazine entitled The Nation, 
received a copy of former President Ford’s soon-to-be-published 
memoirs, which contained significant details about his pardon of former 
President Nixon.258  The Nation received that copy in secret, without 
obtaining authorization to possess, much less publish, its contents.259  Mr. 
Ford had agreed to publish his memoirs with the plaintiffs, who had 
licensed Time magazine to publish excerpts prior to the plaintiffs’ full 
publication of the memoirs.260  A few weeks before Time published the 
excerpts, The Nation published selections of the memoirs.261 
In considering the plaintiffs’ claim of copyright infringement, the 
Supreme Court addressed the relationship between the Copyright Act 
and common-law copyright.262  The Court recognized the absolute nature 
of an author’s right of first publication under the common law.263  The 
Court opined that “fair use traditionally was not recognized as a defense 
                                                     
 253. See infra Part III.B.3. 
 254. See infra Part III.B.3. 
 255. See infra Part III.B.3 (discussing judicial rules regarding fair use that disregarded the 
question of the author’s privacy interest altogether). 
 256. See infra Part III.B.3 (discussing the emergence of “market effect” as the most important 
criterion in applying fair use). 
 257. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 542–43 (1985). 
 258. Id. 
 259. Id. at 543. 
 260. Id. at 542–43. 
 261. Id. at 543. 
 262. Id. at 549–52. 
 263. Id. at 550–51. 
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to charges of copying from an author’s as yet unpublished works.”264  
Fair use was not applied to unpublished works because, according to the 
Court, that defense “was predicated on the author’s implied consent to 
‘reasonable and customary’ use when he released his work for public 
consumption.”265  In the Court’s words: “Under common-law copyright, 
‘the property of the author . . . in his intellectual creation [was] absolute 
until he voluntarily part[ed] with the same.’”266  The Court further 
observed that an author voluntarily parts with the common-law property 
right of expression only when the author publishes the work, either 
through formal publication or “de facto” publication.267 
After acknowledging the common-law privacy protection of 
unpublished works, the Court explained that the Copyright Act adopts 
that protection.268  That adoption, the Court declared, is apparent from 
the fact that the Act recognizes a right of first publication.269  The Court 
further recognized that the Act’s fair-use provision does not “change, 
narrow, or enlarge” the scope of that defense as it had been applied (or 
rather not applied) to unpublished works under the common law.270  The 
Court summed up its analysis with the following rule: “Under ordinary 
circumstances, the author’s right to control the first public appearance of 
his undisseminated expression will outweigh a claim of fair use.”271 
Despite this seeming brightline rule that the Court set forth with 
regards to unpublished works, the Court could not entirely ignore the 
Act’s fair-use provision in view of the fact that the statute appeared to 
allow application of fair use as to all copyright rights, including the right 
of first publication.272  The Court therefore proceeded to address the four  
 
                                                     
 264. Id. 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. at 551 (quoting Am. Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284, 299 (1907), 
superseded by statute, Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (current version at 
17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1332 (2000))) (alterations in original) (emphasis added). 
 267. Id. 
 268. Id. at 552. 
 269. Id. 
 270. Id. at 554 (referencing H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66 (1976), reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5680). 
 271. Id. at 555.  The cited statement contrasts with a statement that the Court later made in the 
same Harper & Row opinion: the Court later stated that the fourth fair-use criterion—the market 
effect—was the “single most important element” in the fair-use analysis.  Id. at 566.  The seeming 
tension between these statements is enigmatic.  It is possible that the Court viewed the fourth 
criterion as the single most important element where an author had already published, or was 
planning to publish, the work. 
 272. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000) (“fair use of a copyrighted work”); Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 
560–69 (analyzing The Nation’s fair-use argument). 
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specific fair-use criteria, noting “that the scope of fair use is narrower 
with respect to unpublished works.”273 
All four fair-use criteria disfavored fair use.274  Because The Nation 
had profited from publishing Mr. Ford’s memoirs, and because the 
rightful copyright holder intended to publish those memoirs, the Court 
held that The Nation had distributed the memoirs for a commercial 
purpose and had caused economic harm to the copyright holder.275  
Likewise, the unpublished nature of the work and the amount and 
substantiality of the memoirs that The Nation used also suggested that 
the use was not fair.276  In determining that all four criteria disfavored 
fair use, the Court appeared to attach greatest weight to the second 
criterion—the nature of the work—as that criterion addressed the fact 
that the memoirs were unpublished.277 
The language of Harper & Row thus indicates that the Court was 
attempting to uphold the privacy protection that the common law had 
afforded unpublished works.278  While expressly acknowledging that 
common-law copyright exists to protect privacy, the Harper & Row 
Court treated the Act as a codification of the existing right of first 
publication under the common law.279  Although the Court recognized 
that the Act allows for a fair-use defense, the Court was careful to point 
out that the Act does not “change, narrow, or enlarge” the fair-use 
doctrine with respect to unpublished works.280  Harper & Row appears to 
be an attempt to uphold common-law privacy protection under the 
Copyright Act.281 
2. Judicial Response to Harper & Row 
After Harper & Row, federal courts of appeals began following the 
Supreme Court’s direction by refusing to apply the fair-use defense to 
                                                     
 273. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564 (emphasis added). 
 274. Id. at 560–69. 
 275. Id. at 561–63, 566–69. 
 276. Id. at 564–66. 
 277. Id. at 564. 
 278. See id. at 550–51, 554 (“[F]air use traditionally was not recognized as a defense to charges 
of copying from an author’s as yet unpublished works.  . . .  It is true that common-law copyright 
was often enlisted in the service of personal privacy.  . . . [The effect of the Copyright Act is to] 
preserve existing law concerning fair use of unpublished works . . . and not to ‘change, narrow, or 
enlarge it.’”). 
 279. Id. at 554 (referencing H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66 (1976), reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5680). 
 280. Id. 
 281. See supra note 278 and accompanying text. 
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unpublished works.282  In Salinger v. Random House, Inc., the Second 
Circuit held that author J.D. Salinger could prohibit defendant Random 
House, Inc. from publishing a biography about Salinger which contained 
excerpts of Salinger’s personal letters to various friends.283  After 
viewing a draft of the biography, Salinger sought protection under the 
Copyright Act for the purpose of keeping the letters private.284  The 
Second Circuit acknowledged that unlike the common law, the Act 
subjects an author’s right of first publication to fair use.285  Yet, 
according to the court, the scope of the fair-use defense as applied to 
unpublished works was rather limited in view of Harper & Row.286  The 
court read Harper & Row to mean that “unpublished letters normally 
enjoy insulation from fair use copying.”287 
After opining on the strong protection afforded unpublished works, 
the Salinger court appeared to treat the fair-use test as a mere 
afterthought.  Although the purpose of the defendants’ use of the 
letters—criticism, scholarship, and research—suggested that the use was 
fair, this fact was not sufficient to overcome the unpublished nature of 
the letters.288  As for the fourth fair-use criterion—the effect of the use on 
the potential market—the Salinger court faced the situation where the 
author disavowed any intent to publish his private letters.289  Undeterred 
by Salinger’s intent not to publish, the court proceeded to rely on the 
value of the letters that Salinger’s agent had estimated, which 
undoubtedly was based on the fact that the letters were unpublished.290  
The fact that Salinger was a famous person, coupled with the fact that 
there existed a single copy of each letter, boosted the letters’ value to 
                                                     
 282. But see Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 953 F.2d 731, 736, 740 (2d Cir. 1991) (applying fair 
use to publication of biography containing excerpts of decedent’s private letters).  The Wright court 
applied fair use arguably because courts appear less likely to protect an author’s privacy interest 
where the author is deceased.  See Kate O’Neill, Against Dicta: A Legal Method for Rescuing Fair 
Use from the Right of First Publication, 89 CAL. L. REV. 369, 392 (2001) (opining that the issue of 
whether an author is alive at the time of the use is a criterion for applying fair use). 
 283. 811 F.2d 90, 92–93, 99–100 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 284. Id. at 93–94. 
 285. Id. at 95. 
 286. Id. at 95, 97. 
 287. Id. at 95. 
 288. Id. at 96–97. 
 289. Id. at 99. 
 290. Id.; see also Kenneth D. Crews, Fair Use of Unpublished Works: Burdens of Proof and the 
Integrity of Copyright, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 20 (1999) (analyzing the alleged $500,000 value on 
which the Salinger court relied).  The strong protection that Harper & Row and Salinger offered 
authors of unpublished works led to widespread revision and in some instances cancellation of 
numerous works that utilized unpublished resources.  Id. at 21. 
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$500,000.291  Because the value was so great, the fact that even a few 
potential consumers might be deterred from purchasing the expression 
was sufficient to find a harmful effect on the market, thereby favoring 
protection of Salinger’s copyright.292  The court construed the fourth fair-
use criterion as favoring the copyright holder directly due to the fact that 
the work under consideration was unpublished.293 
Two years after Salinger, the Second Circuit again heard a case 
involving a biographer’s use of private letters in a biography.294  In New 
Era Publications International, ApS v. Henry Holt & Co., the Second 
Circuit cursorily reiterated its position that the unpublished nature of a 
work weighs heavily in favor of upholding a copyright.295  New Era 
confirmed that absent extraordinary circumstances, an infringing use 
simply could not be fair if the work were unpublished.296 
3. The 1992 Amendment to the Copyright Act 
In response to the judicial trend of providing unpublished works 
near-absolute protection under the Copyright Act, Congress, in 1992, 
passed an amendment to the Copyright Act (“1992 Amendment”).297  
The fair-use provision of the Act was amended to include the following 
sentence: “The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a 
finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the 
[enumerated fair-use] factors.”298  The 1992 Amendment appears to 
constitute a congressional rejection of the idea that if a work were 
unpublished, an author would receive automatic protection absent 
extraordinarily compelling circumstances.299  Expressly rejecting the 
strong protection Salinger provided unpublished works, the House 
Report to the 1992 Amendment notes the legislature’s concern over the 
                                                     
 291. Crews, supra note 290, at 20. 
 292. Salinger, 811 F.2d at 99. 
 293. Id.; Crews, supra note 290, at 20. 
 294. New Era Publ’ns Int’l ApS v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 295. Id. at 583. 
 296. Id.  Owing to a laches defense, the court did not grant the plaintiff relief.  Id. at 584–85. 
Another court following Harper & Row opined that the unpublished nature of letters merits full 
copyright protection, and that fair use “generally applies to materials already released by an author 
for public consumption.”  Sinkler v. Goldsmith, 623 F. Supp. 727, 732 (D. Ariz. 1985). 
 297. Fair Use of Unpublished Works, Pub. L. No. 102-492, 106 Stat. 3145 (codified as amended 
at 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000)). 
 298. Id. 
 299. The legislative history indicates that Congress disapproved of the Second Circuit’s 
interpretation of Harper & Row as establishing a per se rule protecting unpublished works from fair 
use.  H.R. REP. NO. 102-836, at 4–9 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2553, 2555–61. 
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Second Circuit’s statement that unpublished works “‘normally enjoy 
complete protection against copying any protected expression.’”300 
This reaction from the legislature was predictable.  Popular culture 
values expression regardless of, and perhaps because of, its private 
nature.301  Public access to private works benefits the masses at the cost 
of one individual’s privacy.  Representing the populace, Congress had an 
opportunity to maximize public benefit at a minimal cost.  That a 
multitude gained utility where only one individual lost privacy was 
sufficient reason for Congress to undermine the centuries-old doctrine of 
the common-law right of first publication. 
Subsequent to the 1992 Amendment, courts began rejecting the 
principle that unpublished works deserved near-absolute copyright 
protection.302  In Sundeman v. Seajay Society, Inc.,303 the Fourth Circuit 
considered whether fair use protected a defendant’s dissemination of an 
author’s unpublished manuscript.304  After quoting the Supreme Court’s 
language in Harper & Row, which stated that undisseminated expression 
outweighs a claim of fair use, the court opined that this Supreme Court 
mandate was overturned when Congress passed the 1992 Amendment.305  
Controlling the court’s fair-use analysis was the fact that the copies were 
disseminated to only a few parties.306  The dissemination did not detract 
from the commercial viability of the unpublished manuscript, but rather 
may have promoted commercial interest in the manuscript.307  
Commercial value dictated application of fair use.308  Privacy was never 
mentioned, much less considered.309 
                                                     
 300. Id. at 8 (quoting Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 97 (2d Cir. 1987)). 
 301. See, e.g., Grimmelmann, supra note 5 (explaining public popularity of email 
correspondence intended to be private). 
 302. Also telling about the effect of the 1992 Amendment are those cases decided just after the 
Amendment’s enactment, yet based on facts that occurred prior to its enactment.  As the Amendment 
was not retroactive, those courts held that fair use did not apply to the unpublished works at issue.  
See CSM Investors, Inc. v. Everest Dev., Ltd., 840 F. Supp. 1304, 1313 (D. Minn. 1994) (relying on 
Harper & Row’s statement that “the scope of fair use is narrower with respect to unpublished works” 
to find that fair use did not apply to unpublished architectural designs); Lish v. Harper’s Magazine 
Found., 807 F. Supp. 1090, 1101 n.10, 1104–05 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (denying fair use for publication of 
private letters despite fact that the effect on the market favored fair use, but purporting that the 
Amendment’s application would have made no difference in its decision). 
 303. 142 F.3d 194 (4th Cir. 1998). 
 304. Id. at 201. 
 305. Id. at 204–05. 
 306. Id. at 206–07. 
 307. Id. at 207. 
 308. Id. at 207–08. 
 309. See id. at 202 (failing to set forth privacy as a factor used to guide a court when deciding 
whether the fair-use doctrine applies). 
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In Norse v. Henry Holt & Co.,310 another federal court relied on the 
Amendment to apply fair use to unpublished works.311  On remand from 
the Ninth Circuit, a California district court considered whether to apply 
fair use where an author’s embarrassing statements in his private letters 
appeared in a published book.312  Twice referring to the 1992 
Amendment, the court determined that the fair-use criteria overall 
favored labeling the defendant’s publication as fair.313  As for the 
purpose of the use, the book containing the private letters was a scholarly 
biography—albeit with commercial potential—and scholarship 
suggested a permissible use.314  As for market effect, the court treated 
this factor as “the single most important element of fair use.”315  The 
publisher’s use of the letters, the court declared, would not have 
adversely affected the publication value to the author.316  Moreover, in 
conjunction with this “most important” fair-use criterion, the court noted 
the absence of any market for the letters.317  Fair use thereby deprived the 
author of his privacy. 
Consistent with the above caselaw, the 1992 Amendment appears to 
preclude federal copyright protection for most email expression.  The 
Amendment subjects unpublished works to the full force of fair use, and 
accordingly has led courts to ignore an author’s privacy interest under 
prior copyright jurisprudence.318  Where an email expression has no 
commercial value, the 1992 Amendment expressly places the expression 
outside the protection of federal copyright law.  Simply put, the 
Copyright Act fails to protect email privacy. 
C. Two Competing Interests Under One Copyright Theory 
The above discussion regarding caselaw interpretation of the 1992 
Amendment portrays a conundrum that email presents under the 
Copyright Act.  On the one hand, the Act purports to protect privacy 
                                                     
 310. 847 F. Supp. 142 (N.D. Cal. 1994). 
 311. Id. at 146–47. 
 312. Id. at 144. 
 313. Id. at 146–47. 
 314. Id. at 145. 
 315. Id. at 147 (internal quotations omitted). 
 316. Id. 
 317. Id. 
 318. See Sundeman v. Seajay Soc’y, Inc., 142 F.3d 194, 208 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that 
defendant’s use of an unpublished manuscript was permissible under the fair-use exception); Norse, 
847 F. Supp. at 142 (holding that defendant biographer was protected by fair-use defense after 
publishing author’s private letters). 
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interests by providing a right of first publication.319  Historically that 
right has existed for the purpose of allowing authors the opportunity to 
keep their works private.320  Email falls within this category of 
copyright.321  On the other hand, the Act represents an attempt to provide 
an optimal level of creative works for public consumption.322  The Act 
engenders creative works by providing commercial incentive to produce 
them in the form of a production monopoly.323  The Act further allows 
for unrestricted public access to creative works where the monopolistic 
commercial incentive is unnecessary.324  Fair use provides this access,325 
and it is squarely at odds with an author’s privacy interest.326  A 
contradiction thus arises between the purposes of the Act.327  Privacy 
protection under the right of first publication competes with public 
access under the fair-use doctrine.328 
The tension between privacy protection and public access stems from 
a fundamental difference in philosophies of property.  At the root of an 
author’s right of first publication is the Lockean principle that labor 
results in absolute property.329  According to John Locke, a laborer holds 
                                                     
 319. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000) (Historical and Statutory Notes). 
 320. Goldstein, supra note 70, at 1004; Warren & Brandeis, supra note 70, at 198–200, 204–05. 
 321. See supra Part II.A (discussing common-law privacy rights of email senders). 
 322. See Leval, supra note 88, at 1118–19 (characterizing the goal of the Copyright Act as the 
stimulation of authorship for public edification). 
 323. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 227 n.4 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The sole 
interest of the United States and the primary object in conferring the monopoly lie in the general 
benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors.  It is said that reward to the author or artist 
serves to induce release to the public of the products of his creative genius.” (internal quotations 
omitted)). 
 324. See Leval, supra note 88, at 1118–20 (opining that fair use should apply to works that 
copyright was not designed to stimulate). 
 325. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). 
 326. See Crews, supra note 290, at 35–36 (“Legitimate privacy concerns should be analyzed 
directly and not be entangled with copyright law.  Privacy is a serious right to be respected, but 
privacy law and copyright have conflicting objectives.” (footnote omitted)). 
 327. See id. at 36 (“Privacy secures confidential actions, thoughts, and writings; copyright, by 
contrast, seeks to promote the growth of knowledge through public dissemination of information.” 
(citing Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis’s 
Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291, 292–93 (1983))). 
 328. See Note, Personal Letters: In Need of a Law of Their Own, 44 IOWA L. REV. 705, 715 
(1959) [hereinafter Personal Letters] (arguing that copyright law does not adequately provide the 
proprietary protection necessary to secure privacy of personal correspondence on the basis that “the 
injury sustained by the unauthorized publication or dissemination of private letters is usually quite 
different from that arising from the piracy of an author’s literary work”). 
 329. See Baker v. Libbie, 97 N.E. 109, 111 (Mass. 1912) (“It is generally recognized that one 
has a right to the fruits of his labor . . . .  The labor of composing letters for private and familiar 
correspondence may be trifling, or it may be severe, but it is none the less the result of an 
expenditure of thought and time.”); JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 306 (Peter 
Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2d ed. 1967) (1690) (opining that property rights vest when a 
person exerts labor over a thing in a way that excludes the common right that others hold in the 
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absolute property rights in the product of his or her labor.330  The 
absolute rights of property allow the laborer to control the uses of the 
product of his labor against all others.331  In the email context, because 
the email expression results from the labor of the sender, according to 
Locke that expression would be a product over which the sender holds 
absolute property rights.332  Locke’s view suggests that an email sender 
has a right to control the product that results from the sender’s effort to 
communicate an idea.333  Maintaining privacy in an email expression is, 
under Lockean philosophy, a manifestation of the property-based control 
an email sender may exercise. 
In contrast to the Lockean philosophy that is manifest in an author’s 
right of first publication, the fair-use doctrine represents a completely 
different property philosophy.  Fair use is a manifestation of a utilitarian 
view of property.334  Under the utilitarian philosophy, property rights 
exist to increase society’s net welfare.335  Awarding an author a property 
right to mass produce an expression encourages authors to create works 
for public consumption, ultimately increasing social welfare.336  
Conversely, where works exist without a need for production incentives, 
the utilitarian theory posits that copyright law should not reward authors 
with property rights.337  For such works, social welfare is greater without 
property rights bestowed on the authors.  Fair use, then, is the means 
                                                                                                                       
thing). 
 330. LOCKE, supra note 329, at 306. 
 331. Id. 
 332. See id. (“For this Labour being the unquestionable Property of the Labourer, no Man but he 
can have a right to [it] . . . .”); see also Grigsby v. Breckinridge, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 480, 485 (1867) 
(basing its holding that letters merit proprietary protection on the rationale that “[a] production of the 
mind is property in every essential sense in which a production of the hands is the producer’s 
property”); Baker, 97 N.E. at 111 (“The basic principle on which the right of the author is sustained . 
. . is not their literary quality, but the fact that they are the product of labor.”). 
 333. See sources cited supra note 332 (explaining that one who creates something has the right 
to control it). 
 334. See Leval, supra note 88, at 1107–10 (arguing that the goal of copyright is utilitarian in 
nature by furthering creation of works and providing exceptions, such as fair use, to promote this 
goal). 
 335. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 n.18 (2003) (commenting on the Copyright Act, 
and noting that “‘the incentive to profit from the exploitation of copyrights will redound to the public 
benefit by resulting in the proliferation of knowledge.’” (quoting Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco 
Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1, 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff’d 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994))); Leval, supra note 88, at 
1109 (“The copyright law embodies a recognition that creative intellectual activity is vital to the 
well-being of society.  It is a pragmatic measure by which society confers monopoly-exploitation 
benefits for a limited duration on authors and artists . . . in order to obtain for itself the intellectual 
and practical enrichment that results from creative endeavors.”). 
 336. Leval, supra note 88, at 1109. 
 337. See id. at 1109–10 (discussing rationale for allowing fair use in light of the incentive that 
copyright provides for fostering creativity). 
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whereby courts may determine whether protecting an author’s monopoly 
will benefit social welfare.338  Privacy is unimportant in that 
determination.339  Most important is the economic effect of the use, for 
that affects the author’s incentive to produce the work.340  Tellingly, 
many common-law courts noted a conclusion contrary to this economic-
value criterion of fair use: those courts concluded that the absence of 
literary value should not affect legal protection of an author’s right of 
first publication.341 
Any privacy protection the Copyright Act purportedly offers appears 
to be incidental to the Act’s utilitarian end.  Application of the fair-use 
defense to unpublished private works, especially since the 1992 
Amendment, has become the norm.  Furthermore, it is apparent that the 
Act focuses on utilitarian principles at the expense of an author’s privacy 
based on the Act’s registration requirement.  In order to obtain relief 
under the Act, an author must make the expression available for public 
inspection by registering it with the Copyright Office.342  This 
registration requirement means that even if fair use did not apply to a 
casual email, the email sender’s attempt to enforce privacy would in fact 
decrease that privacy.343  As soon as the sender would register the email 
                                                     
 338. See id. at 1107–10 (commenting that fair use is consistent with the utilitarian focus of 
copyright law). 
 339. See discussion supra Part III.B.3 (“That a multitude gained utility where only one 
individual lost privacy was sufficient reason for Congress to undermine the centuries-old doctrine of 
the common-law right of first publication.”). 
 340. See discussion supra Part III.B.3 (“Commercial value dicatated application of fair use.”). 
 341. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 346 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) (Story, J.) (“I hold, 
that the author of any letter or letters . . . whether they are literary compositions, or familiar letters, 
or letters of business, possess the sole and exclusive copyright therein . . . .”); Baker v. Libbie, 97 
N.E. 109, 111 (Mass. 1912) (“The existence of a right in the author over his letters, even though 
private and without worth as literature, is established on principle and authority.”); Woolsey v. Judd, 
11 How. Pr. 49, 63, 68 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1855) (commenting that “[e]very writing, in which words are 
so arranged as to convey the thoughts of the writer to the mind of a reader, is a literary composition” 
to support its holding that copyright applies to “private letters, although not intended to be published, 
and however familiar and trivial the subjects to which they relate”); Gee v. Pritchard, (1818) 36 Eng. 
Rep. 670, 675–76 (Ch.) (“It has been decided, fortunately for the welfare of society, that the writer 
of letters, though written without any purpose of profit, or any idea of literary property, possesses 
such a right of property in them, that they cannot be published without his consent, unless the 
purposes of justice, civil or criminal, require the publication.”); accord Denis v. LeClerc, 1 Mart. 
(o.s.) 297, 302 (Orleans 1811) (noting that “the right of publishing a letter remains exclusively in the 
writer” notwithstanding that the letter was “not written with a view to profit”). 
 342. See 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2000) (“[N]o action for infringement of the copyright in any United 
States work shall be instituted until preregistration or registration of the copyright claim has been 
made . . . .”); 17 U.S.C. § 705(a)–(b) (2000) (“The Register of Copyrights shall ensure that records 
of . . . registrations . . . shall be open to public inspection.”); Tedder Boat Ramp Sys. v. Hillsborough 
County, 54 F. Supp. 2d 1300, 1303 (M.D. Fla. 1999) (“[C]opyrights are available to the public for 
examination and viewing purposes.”). 
 343. See Crews, supra note 290, at 17 n.74 (commenting on the irony that arises when a 
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expression to bring suit, the expression would be available for public 
viewing.344  The reason for this registration requirement appears to be 
that it facilitates public utility as an exchange for the author’s copyright 
monopoly.345  Simply stated, it furthers public benefit.  Wholly utilitarian 
in nature, the registration requirement is completely at odds with 
protecting privacy interests.346 
The Copyright Act thus appears to acknowledge the dual purposes of 
copyright protection without providing separate legal theories for each 
purpose.  The two purposes compete: one purports to keep expression 
private; the other seeks to engender public consumption of expression.347  
The Act creates an appearance of serving the former purpose through its 
right of first publication,348 but in reality the Act serves only the latter, as 
evidenced by its fair-use provision.349  The coexistence of these two 
competing interests under the same legal theory is dubious.350  Although 
this tension has arisen prior to the advent of email, its presence is more 
frequent and pronounced in the email context than in the occasional 
circumstance involving letters cited in a biography.  As email forwarding 
abounds, the Act sacrifices email privacy for public access to expression. 
D. Resolution of the Privacy Conundrum 
The apparent conflict in the Copyright Act which seems to leave 
email expression without privacy protection may be resolvable.  A strong 
argument supports the view that the Act does not preempt the common-
law right of first publication.351  The starting point for this argument 
begins with the starting point for the Copyright Act: the Constitution.352 
                                                                                                                       
copyright holder interested in protecting privacy seeks to enforce protection by registering the 
private work); Leval, supra note 88, at 1130 (same). 
 344. See sources cited supra note 343. 
 345. An author need not register the work prior to the infringing act to invoke federal copyright 
protection.  17 U.S.C. § 411 (Historical and Statutory Notes).  Registration must merely occur prior 
to bringing suit.  Id. 
 346. See sources cited supra note 343. 
 347. See Crews, supra note 290, at 36 (stating privacy and “growth of knowledge through public 
dissemination” are conflicting objectives). 
 348. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2000) (giving copyright owners exclusive right to distribute 
copyrighted works). 
 349. See id. § 107 (allowing noncopyright owners to copy and distribute copyrighted works in 
certain circumstances). 
 350. See Crews, supra note 290, at 35–36 (arguing that privacy interests should not be protected 
under copyright law). 
 351. See infra Part III.D.1–2 (discussing congressional power to enact copyright laws under the 
Constitution and the common law). 
 352. See infra Part III.D.1 (discussing the powers and limitations of congressional copyright 
authority under the Constitution). 
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1. A Constitutional Challenge to the Scope of the Copyright Act 
Congressional power to enact the Copyright Act stems from the 
Copyright and Patent Clause in the Constitution.353  The Clause states 
that Congress has power to “promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”354  The 
Clause is unmistakably utilitarian in nature.355  It grants Congress power 
to legislate property rights that promote the progress of science and 
useful arts.356  The words “progress” and “useful” suggest that the 
property rights granted by Congress must provide society some sort of 
utility.357  Federal property rights encompass rights that progress societal 
understanding of science or that provide societal utility through arts.358  
A work falls within the scope of the Copyright and Patent Clause 
inasmuch as it progresses science or promotes usefulness, regardless of 
how minute the progress or use may be, how subjectively the progress or 
use may be measured, or how few members of society benefit from the 
progress or use.359 
This apparent utilitarian purpose underlying the Copyright and 
Patent Clause implies that a right which fails to progress science or 
promote usefulness does not fall within the scope of that Clause.360  
Congress may legislate only those rights that promote the progress of 
science or the useful arts.361  Any right that does otherwise is a right that 
                                                     
 353. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 (2003) (describing the congressional authority to 
enact the Copyright Act under the Copyright and Patent Clause, and commenting that the Clause acts 
as “both a grant of power and a limitation”). 
 354. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 355. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The economic philosophy behind the clause 
empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of 
individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of 
authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’”); Leval, supra note 88, at 1119 (describing the 
purpose of the Copyright and Patent Clause as furthering public illumination). 
 356. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 357. See WEBSTER’S ENCYCLOPEDIC UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
(1989) (defining “progress” to mean “gradual betterment; especially: the progressive development of 
humankind,” and “useful” to mean “capable of being put to use; especially: serviceable for an end or 
purpose”). 
 358. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 359. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 (2003) (“[I]t is generally for Congress, not the 
courts, to decide how best to pursue the Copyright Clause’s objectives.”). 
 360. See Leval, supra note 88, at 1119 (“Placing all unpublished private papers under lock and 
key, immune from any fair use, for periods of fifty to one hundred years, conflicts with the purposes 
of the copyright clause.  Such a rule would use copyright to further secrecy and concealment instead 
of public illumination.”). 
 361. During a congressional hearing on whether fair use could apply to unpublished works, 
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Congress may not legislate under the Clause.  The Constitution therefore 
appears to prevent Congress from creating rights that do not serve the 
utilitarian end of the Copyright and Patent Clause.362 
This interpretation of the Copyright and Patent Clause is consistent 
with Supreme Court jurisprudence.  Several Supreme Court Cases clearly 
portray the utilitarian focus of the Clause.363  On two occasions the Court 
has described the “philosophy behind” the Clause as “the conviction that 
encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to 
advance public welfare through the talents of authors.”364  Similarly, the 
Court has recognized that “the incentive to profit from the exploitation of 
copyrights will redound to the public benefit by resulting in the 
proliferation of knowledge.”365  In no uncertain terms, the Court has 
recognized the end of the Copyright and Patent Clause as providing 
social benefit.366  Indeed, serving the public good and advancing public  
 
                                                                                                                       
Judge Pierre Leval of the federal district court for the Southern District of New York testified as 
follows: “Protecting the right of privacy [through copyright] does not promote the progress of 
science and the useful arts.  To the contrary, it serves secrecy.  The Constitution does not grant to 
Congress a power to pass tort laws for the protection of privacy.”  Fair Use and Unpublished Works: 
Joint Hearing on S. 2370 and H.R. 4263 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and 
Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop., 
and the Admin. of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 107 (1990); see also 
Crews, supra note 290, at 36 (agreeing with the previously cited statement of Judge Leval). 
 362. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 212 (interpreting the Copyright and Patent Clause as “both a grant 
of power and a limitation”).  Congress’s powers are limited to those enumerated in the Constitution.  
See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000) (“Every law enacted by Congress must be 
based on one or more of its powers enumerated in the Constitution.”). 
 363. See, e.g., Eldred, 537 U.S. at 212 n.18 (“[E]ncouragement of individual effort by personal 
gain is the best way to advance public welfare.”); Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 
U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (stating the goal of copyright law is to “promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts.”); Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1966) (stating that Thomas 
Jefferson recognized the “social and economic rationale of the patent system”); Mazer v. Stein, 347 
U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (same as Eldred). 
 364. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 212 n.18 (emphasis added); Mazer, 374 U.S. at 219 (emphasis added). 
 365. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 212 n.18 (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted). 
 366. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 212 n.18 (“[A]s James Madison observed, in copyright the public 
good fully coincides with the claims of individuals.  . . . [C]opyright law serves public ends by 
providing individuals with an incentive to pursue private ones.” (internal quotations omitted)); Feist, 
499 U.S. at 349 (“The primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but ‘to 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.’”).  The Court has cited the writing of Thomas 
Jefferson for insight into the Copyright and Patent Clause as it applies to patents: 
[Jefferson] rejected a natural-rights theory in intellectual property rights and clearly 
recognized the social and economic rationale of the patent system.  The patent monopoly 
[and thereby the copyright monopoly] was not designed to secure to the inventor [and 
author] his natural right in his discoveries.  Rather, it was a reward, an inducement, to 
bring forth new knowledge. 
Graham, 383 U.S. at 8–9. 
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welfare is a utilitarian philosophy.367  Supreme Court jurisprudence 
indicates that the Copyright and Patent Clause serves a utilitarian end.368 
The Supreme Court has also recognized that the Clause’s utilitarian 
end limits Congress’s power.369  In Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas 
City, the Court commented that the purpose of the Clause places a 
restriction on congressional power to create property rights.370  The Court 
stated: “The Congress in the exercise of the patent power [and thereby 
the copyright power] may not overreach the restraints imposed by the 
stated constitutional purpose.”371  Although the Court considered the 
Clause’s application to the patent system, Congress’s patent power arises 
from the same Clause: the Court’s comments regarding that Clause 
should apply in the copyright context as well.  The purpose of the 
Copyright and Patent Clause—utilitarian public benefit—limits the rights 
that Congress can legislate. 
This constitutional limitation severely restricts the federal right of 
first publication under the Copyright Act.  Specifically, the right of first 
publication under the Act is valid only to the extent that it serves a 
utilitarian end.  A utilitarian end exists only if there is a possibility that 
the author will publicly disseminate the work.372  Absent the possibility 
of publication, there is no utilitarian end for the Act’s right of first 
publication to further.373  So from the time that the author contemplates 
publication through the time of actual publication, the Act’s right of first 
publication protects the author’s interest in realizing commercial gain 
from the work.374  But prior to an author ever contemplating the 
possibility of publication, the Act’s right of first publication furthers no 
utilitarian end.375  In that situation, the federal right remains dormant.  
That is, where an author seeks to hold the work private, the right does not 
                                                     
 367. See discussion supra Part III.C (analyzing the tension between authors’ rights to protection 
and the pubic benefit gained through access to information). 
 368. See cases cited supra note 363. 
 369. Graham, 383 U.S. at 5–6. 
 370. Id.; accord Eldred, 537 U.S. at 212 (quoting Graham as describing the Copyright and 
Patent Clause as “both a grant of power and a limitation”). 
 371. Graham, 383 U.S. at 5–6. 
 372. See Leval, supra note 88, at 1119 (contrasting copyright coverage for works intended and 
not intended for publication in light of the scope of the Copyright and Patent Clause). 
 373. See id. at 1109–10 (explaining how an author’s exploitation of a monopoly benefits the 
public good). 
 374. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 554–55 (1985) 
(discussing dichotomy between right of first publication’s commercial-interest protection and right 
of first publication’s privacy-interest protection); Leval, supra note 88, at 1120–21 (analyzing the 
state at which authors should receive copyright protection for yet-to-be-published works). 
 375. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 554 (stating that the rationale for protecting works that the 
author had no intention to publish has focused on personal privacy). 
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serve a utilitarian end.376  The author’s interest in holding the work 
private implies the absence of a commercial interest, and therefore, the 
absence of a utilitarian purpose.377  Thus, the purpose of the Copyright 
and Patent Clause—to further public utility—restricts the scope of the 
federal right of first publication.  An author may invoke that right only 
when the author contemplates publishing a work.378 
2. The Survival of Common-Law Copyright 
The constitutional restriction on the federal right of first publication 
implies that the Copyright Act should not preempt the common-law 
copyright protection of an author’s privacy interest.  The Act provides 
that it preempts common-law rights “that are equivalent to any of the 
exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by 
section 106.”379  The right of first publication specified in § 106 of the 
Act is not “equivalent” to the common-law right of first publication.380  
The former serves utilitarian interests; the latter serves privacy interests.  
As stated above, the Constitution limits the property rights that Congress 
may create to those which serve a utilitarian purpose.  Accordingly, the 
Act’s right of first publication should not be construed as preempting a 
right that serves a contrary interest. 
                                                     
 376. See Leval, supra note 88, at 1118–19 (“The second [fair-use] factor should not turn solely, 
nor even primarily, on the published/unpublished dichotomy.  At issue is the advancement of the 
utilitarian goal of copyright—to stimulate authorship for the public edification.”). 
 377. See id. at 1116–19 (discussing historical treatment of writings not intended for publication). 
 378. The fact that the federal right of first publication under the Copyright Act is not violated by 
distributing a work to a few acquaintances is consistent with the utilitarian theory underlying federal 
copyright law.  See discussion supra Part III.A.1 (discussing exclusive rights in the context of 
email).  Consider the following example: A book editor makes a copy of a yet-to-be-published novel 
with the permission of the author, but then gives that copy to a friend without the author’s 
permission.  Infringement would lie under the common-law right of first publication, see discussion 
supra Part III.A.2 (noting that common-law copyright provides a nearly absolute bar against 
publication).  It would not lie, however, under federal law.  See discussion supra Part III.A.1 (noting 
that distribution of a single copy of the work does not appear to constitute a publication under 
federal copyright law).  The number of persons to whom the editor distributed the copies was too 
minimal to constitute a public distribution sufficient to invoke the federal right.  This is so because 
copies distributed to a de minimis number of third parties would not negatively affect the aggregate 
market for an author’s work.  See On Davis v. Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 172 (2d Cir. 2001) (“The de 
minimis doctrine essentially provides that where unauthorized copying is sufficiently trivial, ‘the law 
will not impose legal consequences.’”).  The author’s incentive to distribute the work to the public is 
preserved, so the utilitarian purpose of copyright does not warrant an infringement. 
 379. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2000) (emphasis added). 
 380. See supra Part III.D.1 (discussing utilitarian policy of the Copyright Clause and its 
application to the Copyright Act). 
SNOW FINAL.DOC 7/15/2007  3:48:30 PM 
562 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55 
If an author intends to withhold a work from ever being published, 
the Act’s right of first publication would not apply in that situation.381  
The right effectively remains dormant.382  The author has no commercial 
interest, so there is no possibility of public access, further implying that 
there is no invocation of the federal right of first publication.383  Under 
the common law, however, the right of first publication would apply.384  
Where the author does not even contemplate publishing a work, the 
common law offers a right that protects expressive privacy.385  Whereas 
the federal right of first publication lies dormant in the absence of an 
intent to publicly disseminate, the common-law right of first publication 
is at that point in full force.386  The federal right protects an author from 
being scooped; the common-law right protects an author from being 
found out.  The rights should not be construed as being “equivalent.”  
There should be no preemption.387 
Another reason that the Act should not be viewed as preempting the 
common law right of first publication is that it leads to an absurd 
outcome.  Preemption of a right facilitating the privacy of a work 
effectively represents a means to strip away that right through the fair-
use defense.388  Because casual correspondence held private is by 
definition a work that has no potential economic value or market, it will 
never receive federal copyright protection.389  The federal right of first 
publication, then, does not represent a “right” as to private works.  It 
represents a deprivation of a right.  If preempted, a common-law right 
that secures private expression would always be subject to the federal 
fair-use defense.390  For authors of private works, the federal “right” 
would effectively represent the federal defense.391  Preemption would not 
effect a right replacement, but rather a right deprivation. 
                                                     
 381. See supra Part III.D.1 (arguing that the apparent utilitarian purpose of the Copyright and 
Patent Clause implies that a right that does not progress science or the useful arts does not fall within 
the scope of the Clause). 
 382. See supra Part III.D.1. 
 383. See supra Part III.D.1 (arguing that the Constitution may prevent Congress from creating 
rights that do not serve the Copyright and Patent Clause’s utilitarian ends). 
 384. See supra Parts II.A.1, III.D.1 (discussing common law protection of privacy). 
 385. See supra Parts II.A.1, III.D.1. 
 386. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 554–55 (1985) 
(comparing commercial-interest protection of the Copyright Act with privacy-interest protection of 
common-law copyright); supra Parts II.A.1, III.D.1. 
 387. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2000) (providing that “equivalent” rights are preempted). 
 388. See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the common-law right of first publication). 
 389. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 390. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 391. See supra Part II.A.2. 
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The view that the Copyright Act should not preempt the common-
law right of first publication is supported by portions of the Act’s 
legislative history.  The legislative history states: “[C]ommon law rights 
of ‘privacy’ . . . would remain unaffected [by the Copyright Act] as long 
as the causes of action contain elements, such as an invasion of personal 
rights or a breach of trust or confidentiality, that are different in kind 
from copyright infringement.”392  This statement is relevant in light of 
the privacy argument set forth by Warren and Brandeis in their article, 
The Right to Privacy, discussed above.393  They argued that the common-
law right of first publication represents a common-law right of 
privacy.394  That this right has a copyright label does not detract from its 
function of protecting an author’s interest in keeping expression private, 
they contended.395  The right of first publication is, according to Warren 
and Brandeis, a right of privacy.396  The congressional history of the Act, 
which recognizes that the Act does not extend to “rights of ‘privacy,’”397 
contravenes preemption of the common-law right of first publication. 
Interpreting the federal right of first publication under the Copyright 
Act as applying only to works intended to be published is consistent with 
the 1992 Amendment.398  The fact that the Amendment subjects 
unpublished works to the fair-use defense is consistent with the view that 
the federal right of first publication protects an author’s commercial 
interest only in an unpublished work that is yet to be published.  To the 
extent that a work will be published, a fair-use analysis is appropriate to 
evaluate the utilitarian value of protecting the yet-to-be-published 
work.399  That the work is not yet published may be a fact to consider in 
the fair-use analysis, but it should not be controlling.400  Given that the 
work will eventually be published, the second criterion—the nature of 
the work—appears secondary to the fourth criterion—the effect of the 
                                                     
 392. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 132 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5748.  But see 
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 554 (1985) (concluding that the 
effect of the Act is “to preserve existing law concerning fair use of unpublished works”). 
 393. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 70, at 198–205. 
 394. Id. at 198–99, 204–05. 
 395. Id. at 204–05. 
 396. Id. at 205. 
 397. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 132 (1976), reprinted in 176 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5748. 
 398. Fair Use of Unpublished Works, Pub. L. No. 102-492, 106 Stat. 3145 (codified at 17 U.S.C. 
§ 107 (2000)). 
 399. See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 554–55 (1985) 
(analyzing fair-use defense as applied to a soon-to-be-published unpublished work). 
 400. See Leval, supra note 88, at 1118–19 (arguing that the fact that a work is unpublished 
should not affect the second fair-use criterion—the nature of the copyrighted work—as the 
Copyright Act concerns works intended for publication). 
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use on the potential market.401  By lessening the weight that courts 
should attach to the unpublished nature of a work, the 1992 Amendment 
is consistent with interpreting the Act so that it does not preempt 
common-law protection of privacy. 
It should be noted that the Copyright Act does preempt a portion of 
the common-law right of first publication.  Recall that the common-law 
right of first publication comprises a two-step right: an author first has a 
right to decide whether to publish; if the author does decide to publish, 
the author next has a right to decide when to publish.402  In this manner, 
the common-law right of first publication has protected a work up to the 
time of publication.403  The first stage may be described as the right to 
refrain from publishing, and it is this stage in which the author seeks to 
maintain privacy.404  The second stage represents the time between the 
decision to publish and the actual publication.405  As discussed above, the 
author holds an interest in making the work commercial during this 
second stage.406  This second stage in the right of first publication is 
therefore preempted.407  Federal law governs from the point that an 
author decides to publish, regardless of when the publication actually 
occurs. 
The argument that the Copyright Act does not preempt the entire 
common-law right of first publication is seemingly inconsistent with the 
Supreme Court decision in Harper & Row.408  There the Court suggested 
that the Copyright Act preempts the common-law right of first 
publication, even the portion of that right that had been applied to protect 
privacy interests.409  Yet the actual holding of Harper & Row does not 
require that that suggestion be valid.  The issue in Harper & Row was 
whether The Nation had infringed the copyright holder’s right of first 
publication by publishing memoirs that were scheduled to be published 
                                                     
 401. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566 (describing the fourth criterion as “the single most 
important element of fair use”). 
 402. See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the common-law right of first publication). 
 403. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 404. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 405. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 406. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 407. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2000) (preemption applies whether published or not). 
 408. See supra Part III.B.1 (discussing Harper & Row). 
 409. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 552–55 (1985) 
(commenting that the Copyright Act “eliminated publication as a ‘dividing line between common 
law and statutory protection,’ extending statutory protection to all works from the time of their 
creation,” and discussing common-law copyright protection of privacy while discussing the scope of 
the Act (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 52 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5665)). 
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at a later date.410  Key is the fact that the copyright holder had already 
decided to publish the memoirs.411  As discussed in the paragraph above, 
the Act does preempt the common-law right of first publication with 
regard to works that are set to be published, although they in fact are not 
published.  This means that the Act preempted the common-law right 
protecting the memoirs at issue in Harper & Row, for the author had 
already decided to publish them.412  The Harper & Row Court’s language 
suggesting that the Act preempts common-law protection of privacy413 
was therefore not relevant to the issue under consideration.  The facts 
suggested that preemption applied with regard to an author’s commercial 
interest in a yet-to-be-published work,414 so the troublesome language 
was dicta. 
Also relevant in analyzing Harper & Row’s language regarding 
preemption is the fact that the 1992 Amendment appears to undermine 
that language.415  To the extent the Harper & Row Court attempted to 
hold that the Copyright Act adopted the privacy protection of common-
law copyright, Congress appears to have abolished that holding through 
the 1992 Amendment.416  The Amendment weakens Harper & Row’s 
representation that the Act protects privacy, and consequently, the 
Amendment also weakens Harper & Row’s representation that the Act 
preempts common-law privacy protection.  In conjunction with the 1992 
Amendment, the law set forth in Harper & Row is consistent with the 
argument that the Copyright Act does not preempt the common-law right 
of first publication. 
This argument against federal preemption of common-law copyright 
raises interesting implications in the email context.  As described in Part 
II, common-law principles imply the following: (1) a private email may 
not be forwarded by its recipient, regardless of how casual or trite the 
correspondence;417 (2) protection for private expression is nearly 
absolute;418 and (3) fair use is not in play.419  The common-law rule of 
                                                     
 410. Id. at 541–42, 552–55. 
 411. See id. at 542–43 (discussing plans for publication). 
 412. Id. 
 413. See supra note 409 for a description of the Court’s comments that suggest the Copyright 
Act preempts the common-law protection of privacy. 
 414. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 554. 
 415. See supra Part III.B.3 (discussing the 1992 Amendment). 
 416. See supra note 318 and accompanying text. 
 417. See supra Part II.A.2.a. 
 418. See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the common-law right of first publication). 
 419. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 549–51 (“[F]air use [under the common law] traditionally 
was not recognized as a defense to charges of copying from an author’s as yet unpublished works.”); 
see also supra Part II.A.2 (“The fact that an unauthorized copy may appear ‘reasonable and 
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relinquishment further implies that if an email sender relinquishes his or 
her common-law right of first publication by publishing the email, 
federal law applies.420  This means that if the sender were to carbon copy 
a third party, the sender would not be able to invoke the common law to 
protect an otherwise private email.421  By carbon copying a third party, 
the sender would publish the email, and thereby waive the common-law 
right of first publication.422  The sender would forego common-law 
protection of privacy.  Any property interest in the expression would 
exist only under the federal Copyright Act.  As discussed above, federal 
protection would be nonextant if the email correspondence were not 
economically valuable: the sender would be stripped of privacy 
protection by the fair-use defense.423  Thus, the common-law right of first 
publication governs only to the extent that an email sender has not 
carbon copied a third party on the email. 
IV. A NORMATIVE ANALYSIS OF A DUAL COPYRIGHT SYSTEM 
The above discussion has presented a theory for protecting privacy 
interests in expression.424  That theory is to bifurcate an author’s right of 
first publication between the common law and federal law according to 
whether an author has affirmatively decided to publish the work.425  
Works that are held private fall under common-law copyright; works that 
will be published fall under federal copyright law.426  This is possible 
because of a constitutional basis for concluding that the Copyright Act 
does not preempt common-law protection of privacy in expression.427 
Although this theory of a dual copyright system may be theoretically 
plausible, the question of whether this theory can and should be put into 
practice is another matter.  A normative analysis of the theory is  
 
                                                                                                                       
customary’ does not affect the strength of the author’s common-law right [of first publication].”). 
 420. See supra Part II.A.2.c (discussing the common-law rule of relinquishment). 
 421. See supra Part II.A.2.c (“Common-law copyright rules . . . suggest that an email sender 
relinquishes the right of first publication when the sender includes a carbon-copy or blind-carbon-
copy recipient in the email.”). 
 422. See supra Part II.A.2.c. 
 423. See supra Part III.A–B (concluding that “where an email expression has no commercial 
value, the 1992 Amendment expressly places the expression outside the protection of federal 
copyright law”). 
 424. See supra Part III.D. 
 425. See supra Part III.D. 
 426. See supra Part III.D. 
 427. See supra Part III.D (arguing that the wording of the Constitution’s Copyright and Patent 
Clause makes it “unmistakably utilitarian in nature,” limiting Congress’s power to legislate such 
property rights to the extent an author has an interest in realizing commercial gain). 
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necessary to evaluate whether both a common-law and federal system of 
copyright should govern property rights in expression.428 
A. Determination of the Applicable Copyright System 
The first issue that arises in evaluating the dual copyright system is 
the pragmatic problem of how to determine whether an author has 
decided to publish a work.429  If the author has decided to publish a yet 
unpublished work, it may be difficult, if not impossible, to verify that 
alleged decision.  Believing that the common law provides a stronger 
basis for prevailing against an infringer than does the Copyright Act, the 
author might recant his or her past decision to publish.  For a defendant, 
establishing an author’s state of mind regarding the finality of a 
publication decision raises a thorny issue of fact.  Excessive resources 
would be necessary to prove that the decision to publish has been made.  
The practical barrier in reaching a determination of whether an author 
has decided to publish arguably poses a pragmatic threat to the proffered 
interpretation of the Copyright Act. 
This practical barrier is resolvable by applying a simple rule: the 
author should be able to choose which law applies.  It is true that by 
allowing a copyright holder to choose between the federal and common-
law copyright systems, the copyright holder will always have the option 
of choosing a system with near-absolute protection over a system that 
allows for a liberal fair-use defense.430  Yet the disparity of remedies 
under the two systems balances their disparity of expressive protection 
available to the author.  The remedies available under common-law 
copyright would be an injunction against publication and compensatory 
damages.431  Compensatory damages would lie only if the author could 
establish emotional harm for invading expressive privacy.432  They would 
not lie for any decrease in the expression’s market value.  As a result, the 
                                                     
 428. See infra Part IV.A–C. 
 429. See Leval, supra note 88, at 1120–21 (discussing factual intricacies that might arise in 
attempting to distinguish between works created for publication and works held private). 
 430. An author could nearly always prevail on a copyright claim under common-law copyright 
given its near-absolute protection of privacy interests.  See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the 
common-law right of first publication).  By contrast, an author would be subject to a liberal 
application of the fair-use defense.  See supra Part III.A.2–B (describing the fair-use doctrine, and 
discussing applicable caselaw and legislative history). 
 431. See Baker v. Libbie, 97 N.E. 109, 112 (Mass. 1912) (issuing injunction against publication 
of letters); Personal Letters, supra note 328, at 708 n.31 (considering possible relief that common-
law copyright affords author). 
 432. See Personal Letters, supra note 328, at 708 n.31 (“[I]t would seem that if damages have 
been sustained a remedy at law exists.”). 
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near-absolute protection available under the common law would only be 
valuable to an author who is concerned with the privacy of the work.  
Federal copyright law, on the other hand, provides remedies that are not 
available under the common law: compensatory damages may be 
awarded for the commercial value of the copyrighted expression, along 
with statutory damages.433  The Copyright Act would therefore be 
valuable to an author who is concerned with realizing the commercial 
potential of the work.  The remedies available under common-law or 
federal copyright reflect the respective interests of either privacy or 
commercial gain that an author may hold in the work. 
If an author of an unpublished work chooses which law should 
control the suit, the author will select the law corresponding to the 
remedy that best serves the author’s interest.  The author will accordingly 
demonstrate the interest—privacy or commercial gain—that the author 
values.  Where an author is concerned with keeping a work private, the 
author will bring suit under the common law.  Where an author is 
concerned with realizing the commercial value of the work, the author 
will bring suit under federal law.  There would be no thorny issue of fact. 
A few examples illustrate the mechanics of a dual system of 
copyright.  An email that is a casual correspondence—for instance, a 
simple invitation to lunch—may be the subject matter of an injunction 
against the email recipient.  The email sender may enjoin the recipient 
from forwarding the simple expression in the email.434  If the recipient 
has already forwarded the email, the sender may sue for damages.  
Assuming the lunch-invitation expression is not of an embarrassing 
nature, the sender would not be able to establish emotional harm caused 
by the recipient’s forwarding of the email.435  If, however, the email were 
of an embarrassing nature, compensatory damages would be available.  
For instance, perhaps an employee sends an email to another employee 
complaining of horrific work conditions.  If the recipient forwards the 
email to the sender’s employer, emotional harm would likely ensue.  The 
embarrassment of the exposure would invade the sender’s privacy, and 
potentially result in the termination of the sender’s employment.   
 
                                                     
 433. 17 U.S.C. § 504(a)–(c) (2000).  If infringement is willful, $150,000 may be awarded as 
statutory damages; otherwise the maximum statutory damages amount is $30,000.  Id. 
 434. It seems unlikely that any sender would expend resources necessary to enjoin a recipient 
from forwarding such a seemingly innocuous email as an invitation to lunch.  But perhaps the sender 
was an employee who sent the email to a competitor of the employer; or perhaps the sender was a 
spouse sending the email to a lover.  Circumstances surrounding the expression may provide an 
impetus to seek protection against email forwarding. 
 435. Only nominal damages would lie. 
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Compensatory damages would lie for the emotional harm caused by the 
copyright violation. 
Examples of copyright protection for email under the federal system 
are less apparent.  Email is rarely sent with an intent to publish 
commercially.  But it is possible that circumstances could change so that 
the sender would later decide to realize commercial gain by publishing 
the email.  A good example is Monica Lewinsky’s email regarding her 
relationship with former President Clinton.436  At the time she sent it, the 
email was most assuredly held private.437  But as events unfolded,438 she 
could have sought to capitalize on the expression in the email.  Her 
publication decision could have arisen subsequent to sending the email.  
This decision would have implied that the market value of the email 
outweighed the value of the emotional harm that Ms. Lewinsky would 
have incurred from its public exposure.439  When Newsweek magazine 
published that email, Ms. Lewinsky could have brought suit under the 
Copyright Act for violating her federal right of first publication.440  It is 
arguable that Ms. Lewinsky would prevail on liability.441  Assuming she 
did, damages would be available to compensate Ms. Lewinsky for the 
market value of the email publication.  There would be no damages for 
any emotional harm that Newsweek’s publication caused her. 
Thus, the seeming pragmatic difficulty of determining whether an 
author has decided to publish may not present any difficulty at all.  If an 
author of an unpublished work has an option to decide whether to bring 
                                                     
 436. See Crews, supra note 290, at 32 n.162 (postulating that Ms. Lewinsky’s email messages 
could merit copyright protection). 
 437. See id. (citing He Could Have Called Me, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 23, 1998, at 26–27 (printing 
excerpts from Ms. Lewinsky’s emails)). 
 438. Mark Ribbing, Events Leading to Clinton’s Grand Jury Appearance, THE BALTIMORE SUN, 
Aug. 16, 1998, at A4. 
 439. Assuming that the publication decision arose after the Ken Starr report, the emotional harm 
resulting from publication of the specific email expressions would have been negligible because the 
public already knew the details of her affair.  See In Graphic Detail, Report Says Clinton Lied About 
Affair, THE ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Sept. 12, 1998, at A15 (describing the Starr report as giving 
“dense, at times unsettling, detail about a long-running series of sexual encounters between Clinton 
and Lewinsky”); Referral to the United States House of Representatives pursuant to Title 28, United 
States Code, § 595(c) Submitted by The Office of the Independent Counsel, September 9, 1998, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/clinton/icreport/srprintable.htm (last visited 
Jan. 10, 2007) (Kenneth Starr’s final report on President Clinton to the U.S. House of 
Representatives narrating the nature and circumstances of Clinton’s relationship with Monica 
Lewinsky). 
 440. See Crews, supra note 290, at 32 n.162 (discussing possible copyright infringement by 
Newsweek magazine). 
 441. The argument that Ms. Lewinsky would prevail is based on the fact that courts are reluctant 
to find fair use based solely on a freedom-of-the-press argument.  See, e.g., Harper & Row, 
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 545–46, 560 (1985) (rejecting appellate court’s 
reasoning that freedom of the press justified finding of fair use). 
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suit under the common law or under federal law, the author will select 
the system that best protects the interest which the author values in the 
work—privacy or commercial gain.  The mutually-exclusive nature of 
those interests precludes overlap.442  Available remedies under the two 
different systems will result in the author self-selecting the actual interest 
that the author values most. 
B. The Merits of a Distinct Copyright System for Privacy 
The reason for having both federal and common-law systems of 
copyright is to provide a balance between the two competing interests of 
societal utility and individual privacy.443  Yet the fact that a balance is 
possible does not mean that it is desirable.444  A more fundamental issue 
than whether the law does allow for the coexistence of both privacy and 
utilitarian interests in expression is whether the law should allow for that 
coexistence.445  There are obvious drawbacks to a distinct copyright 
system, the purpose of which is to ensure privacy.  To begin with, 
effectuating common-law copyright will likely breed more litigation than 
common-law copyright has in the past entertained.  In the past, situations 
for protecting privacy interests in unpublished works arose relatively 
infrequently, usually over private letters that biographers or divorced 
spouses sought to publish.446  Copying and distributing a private letter 
was not common.447  Today the situation is markedly different.448  Email 
forwarding has become routine.449  If a sender lacks discretion in drafting 
                                                     
 442. See supra Part III.C (discussing the competing interests under the Copyright Act). 
 443. See supra Part III.C–D (offering resolution to the competing-interest dilemma). 
 444. See, e.g., Edward C. Baig et al., Privacy: The Internet Wants Your Personal Info.  What’s in 
It for You?, BUS. WK., Apr. 5, 1999, at 84 (commenting on internet privacy and observing that users 
“already have zero privacy” and so they should simply “[g]et over it”). 
 445. See AMITAI ETZIONI, THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY 214 (1999) (arguing against legalizing 
privacy rights on the basis that “publicness reduces the need for public control, while excessive 
privacy often necessitates state-imposed limits on private choices” (internal endnote omitted)); 
Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 395–97 (1978) (arguing against the 
concept of privacy offered by Warren and Brandeis—an interest in being let alone—on the grounds 
that privacy serves merely to protect from, or capitalize on, imperfect market information). 
 446. See, e.g., Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 92–94 (2d Cir. 1987) 
(contemplating circumstance of biographer seeking to avoid letter publication); King v. King, 168 P. 
730, 731–33 (Wyo. 1917) (contemplating circumstance of former spouse publishing letter). 
 447. See Grimmelmann, supra note 5 (“[G]oing from paper to bits lowers the cost of copying 
and forwarding.  It takes a pretty important letter to be worth the bother of Xeroxing, stamping, and 
mailing, but even an infinitesimally small benefit is worth the minimal cost of clicking on the 
forward button and typing in a few addresses.”). 
 448. See id. (recounting an illustration of today’s situation). 
 449. See id. (“People who wouldn’t have forwarded a letter will forward an email—and they’ll 
forward it to more people.  . . . Quasi-private emails leak out all the time now, not because we want 
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an email, the sender’s words will likely be seen by many more than the 
original recipient.450  Allowing a cause of action for email forwarding is 
a recipe for liability based on happenstance.  A litigious society will 
exploit the opportunity to hold liable unsuspecting email recipients who 
happen to forward expression. 
It also seems foolish to create a cause of action where the emotional 
harm to the email sender is caused, in large part, by the sender’s own 
indiscretion.  If a sender desires to keep a sentiment private, the sender 
should have omitted it while drafting the email.  Just as a cheating 
husband one-hundred years ago should have thought twice before putting 
incriminating evidence in a letter to his lover,451 so also should today’s 
email senders think through indiscrete expressions before knowingly 
creating an electronic record that can so easily be distributed to the 
world.452  The very fact that the sender chooses to use email suggests that 
the sender assumes a risk that the expression might be forwarded to 
others.453  A legal remedy caused by a complainant’s own indiscrete 
behavior seems unnecessary, if not wasteful.454 
These two criticisms admittedly have strength.  But they do not 
overturn the argument for applying common-law copyright to email 
expression.  The benefit of protecting private expression outweighs its 
cost of creating a cause of action that will give rise to seemingly needless 
litigation that results in part from a plaintiff’s own seemingly 
irresponsible actions.  Protecting private expression from unauthorized 
distribution facilitates creativity, frankness, and efficiency.455  Absent 
protection, an author must guard against an unknown recipient eventually 
obtaining a copy of the expression: such guarding imposes a cost on 
                                                                                                                       
what is private to become public, but because it has become so hard to tell private from public in the 
context of email.”). 
 450. Id. 
 451. See Barrett v. Fish, 47 A. 174, 175–76 (Vt. 1899) (providing account of a party seeking to 
use such letters in criminal adultery proceedings). 
 452. See Mandel, supra note 6 (advising that email senders should restrict their expression to 
that which the senders would be comfortable viewing on “the front page of [their] newspaper”). 
 453. See Grimmelmann, supra note 5 (“The median email is less private and more public in its 
content than the median letter, not because our words care whether they travel by ink or by bits, but 
because we have evolved a set of expectations about email that are less private and more public than 
our expectations about traditional letters.”). 
 454. Cf. Neighbarger v. Irwin Indus., Inc., 882 P.2d 347, 351 (Cal. 1994) (“[T]he doctrine of 
assumption of risk properly bars a plaintiff’s claim only when it can be established that, because of 
the nature of the activity involved and the parties’ relationship to the activity, the defendant owed the 
plaintiff no duty of care.” (citing Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 707–08 (Cal. 1992))). 
 455. See Woolsey v. Judd, 11 How. Pr. 49, 63 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1855) (“[L]etters never intended to 
be published, and written on familiar subjects, are usually more interesting and valuable than those 
elaborately written and originally intended for the press.”); Mandel, supra note 6 (advising restraint 
in email expression). 
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expressive clarity and substance.456  Privacy protection ensures effective 
communication of thought.457 
Even assuming that the policy argument supporting privacy were no 
stronger than the policy argument for decreasing excessive, wasteful 
litigation, the alleged costs of securing privacy are doubtful.  Excessive, 
needless litigation would not likely result.  As discussed above, the 
primary remedies available under common-law copyright would be 
either an injunction preventing the recipient from forwarding the email or 
compensation for emotional harm.458  These remedies suggest that the 
likelihood is fairly low that email senders would flood courts with 
frivolous email-forwarding disputes: attorneys’ fees for enjoining a 
recipient from forwarding an innocuous lunch-invitation email would 
practically bar suit, and proving emotional harm over such an email 
would be more than difficult, if not impossible.  Yet even if courts were 
flooded, the flooding would be both warranted and temporary.  Privacy 
of expression—no matter how trite the expression—merits protection.459  
And as courts recognize this protection, public behavior regarding email 
will change.  The now-common practice of forwarding emails would 
adjust so that email recipients would only forward them with permission.  
This adjustment would thereby strengthen an email sender’s ability to 
engage in frank and creative expression.  Litigation would not be 
excessive or wasteful. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Alive and well is the centuries-old argument for protecting privacy 
of expression.460  Today that argument is especially important given the 
                                                     
 456. See Grimmelmann, supra note 5 (commenting that email forwarding dulls the content and 
context of email expression). 
 457. This protection is not absolute.  As discussed in Part II.B.2, supra, the property rights of an 
email sender are subject to the property rights that an email recipient holds in the physical email file, 
and those rights of the recipient allow the recipient to show the sender’s expression to third parties.  
Similarly, as discussed in Part II.A, supra, the sender’s rights are qualified under extraordinary 
circumstances which would permit a third party to publish the sender’s expression. 
 458. See supra Part IV.A (comparing remedies available under common-law and federal 
copyright systems). 
 459. See Woolsey, 11 How. Pr. at 63 (opining that property rights exist in private letters 
“however familiar and trivial” the expression may be). 
 460. See, e.g., Teresa De Turris, Copyright Protection of Privacy Interests in Unpublished 
Works, 1994 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 277, 307 (1994) (“Protection of privacy interests in unpublished 
works is reasonably within the domain of federal copyright law.”); Stephen B. Thau, Copyright, 
Privacy, and Fair Use, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 179, 202 (1995) (arguing that courts “protect an 
author’s privacy by giving him the ability to control the reproduction and dissemination of works 
that can be viewed as extensions of his personality”); Benjamin Ely Marks, Note, Copyright 
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common practice of email recipients exploiting email senders’ privacy.461  
The argument stems from the common-law right of first publication.462  
That right allows an email sender to decide whether to publish the 
expression in an email to someone other than the intended recipient.463  
Only the sender may decide whether to copy and distribute the email 
expression.464  If the sender does so, often by carbon copying a third 
party, the sender relinquishes the right of first publication.465  If the 
sender does not, the email recipient may not forward the email.466  This 
protection of a sender’s private expression admits few exceptions.467 
In contrast to the common-law right of first publication that an email 
sender holds in email expression, email recipients hold property rights to 
the physical email file.468  These property rights derive from the common 
law’s recognition that a letter recipient holds property rights in the 
physical components of the letter.469  By holding property rights to the 
physical email file, the recipient may transfer the file to a third party, 
which involves either transferring the storage device on which the file 
exists or transferring access rights to view the file through an email-
website service.470  The email recipient may also print and display the 
email at any location.471  Finally, it is noteworthy that unintended 
recipients who receive email do not hold property rights to the email 
against the sender.472 
Federal law should not be construed to strip an email sender of this 
common-law privacy protection.473  Although the Copyright Act purports 
to provide authors a right of first publication, that right provides limited 
                                                                                                                       
Protection, Privacy Rights, and the Fair Use Doctrine: The Post-Salinger Decade Reconsidered, 72 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1376, 1379 (1997) (proposing “an explicit, privacy-based exception to the fair use 
doctrine”).  See generally Robert C. Hauhart, Copyrighting Personal Letters, Diaries, and 
Memorabilia: A Review and a Suggestion, 13 U. BALT. L. REV. 244, 244–45 (1984) (arguing for 
stronger protection of private expression). 
 461. See Grimmelmann, supra note 5 (observing that email forwarding has become 
commonplace). 
 462. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 463. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 464. See supra Part II.A.2 (stating that authors can decide whether and when to publish their 
work). 
 465. See supra Part II.A.2.c. 
 466. See supra Part II.A.2.c. 
 467. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 468. See supra Part II.B. 
 469. See supra Part II.B. 
 470. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 471. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 472. See supra Part II.B.3. 
 473. See supra Part III. 
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to no privacy protection in view of the liberal fair-use defense.474  The 
Supreme Court initially attempted to extend federal copyright law to 
protect privacy interests in unpublished works, but Congress amended 
the Act to cripple the Court’s attempt.475  The Act protects authors’ 
commercial interest to further its utilitarian purpose.476  It does not 
protect privacy.477  The absence of federal privacy protection, however, 
is not fatal to an author’s privacy interest.478  The Copyright and Patent 
Clause in the Constitution requires the Act to have a utilitarian purpose, 
which is mutually exclusive of a purpose that protects individual 
privacy.479  Therefore, the federal right of first publication cannot be 
interpreted as preempting the common-law copyright’s protection of 
privacy.480  The common-law right of first publication that protects an 
author’s decision whether to publish is a right that survives the Copyright 
Act.481  Preemption does not apply.482 
The normative argument in support of having both federal and 
common-law copyright systems is simple.483  Two copyright systems are 
necessary because the purpose of federal copyright law—utilitarian 
public benefit—forecloses the opportunity to realize any privacy 
protection.484  Privacy is a worthy end because it fosters creativity, 
frankness, and efficiency in communication.485  Furthermore, enforcing 
two systems to further their two distinct ends is pragmatically possible: 
email senders will self-select which system serves the interest they most 
value, commercial gain or privacy, based on the available remedies each 
system offers; and any seemingly excessive litigation over email will in 
the end be productive, ensuring senders’ privacy.486  For email to be as 
thoughtful, clear, and creative as possible, privacy of expression must be 
recognized.  Copyright should protect email privacy. 
 
                                                     
 474. See supra Part III.A, III.B.3. 
 475. See supra Part III.B.1–3. 
 476. See supra Part III.C. 
 477. See supra Part III.C. 
 478. See supra Part III.D. 
 479. See supra Part III.D.1. 
 480. See supra Part III.D. 
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 483. See supra Part III.C (discussing competing interest of copyright theory). 
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